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Abstract	  
	  Past	  studies	  have	  suggested	  that	  individuals	  who	  adopt	  a	  psychologically	  immersed,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  psychologically	  distanced	  perspective	  when	  reflecting	  on	  negative	  emotional	  experiences,	  tend	  to	  experience	  greater	  negative	  affect	  and	  have	  more	  difficulty	  reappraising	  their	  experiences	  in	  an	  objective	  manner.	  Psychological	  distancing	  and	  immersion	  have	  not	  been	  studied	  systematically	  in	  socially	  anxious	  (SA)	  individuals,	  despite	  previous	  research	  showing	  that	  trait	  social	  anxiety	  is	  strongly	  associated	  with	  negatively	  biased	  appraisals	  of	  social	  experiences	  during	  self-­‐reflection	  and	  post-­‐event	  processing.	  The	  current	  study	  investigated	  the	  relationship	  between	  trait	  social	  anxiety,	  psychological	  immersion,	  and	  the	  cognitive	  and	  affective	  experiences	  of	  76	  participants	  while	  they	  engaged	  in	  a	  laboratory-­‐based	  social	  task.	  Participants	  wrote	  about	  and	  reflected	  on	  a	  recent	  negative	  experience	  in	  which	  something	  they	  did	  or	  said	  in	  a	  social	  situation	  did	  not	  turn	  out	  the	  way	  they	  thought	  it	  should	  have.	  Thereafter,	  participants	  imagined	  an	  upcoming	  social	  interaction	  in	  which	  they	  believed	  they	  would	  be	  judged	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  impress	  a	  social	  partner.	  Participants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  one	  of	  two	  conditions	  in	  which	  they	  were	  instructed	  to	  self-­‐reflect	  on	  these	  experiences	  in	  a	  distanced	  or	  immersed	  manner.	  Participants	  completed	  self-­‐report	  measures	  of	  affect	  (Positive	  and	  
Negative	  Affect	  Schedule),	  subjective	  distress	  (SUDS),	  cognitions	  (Negative	  Self	  Portrayal	  
Scale),	  and	  psychological	  immersion	  (Five	  Facets	  of	  Mindfulness	  Questionnaire)	  at	  several	  time	  points	  during	  the	  study.	  Although	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  effects	  of	  condition	  in	  the	  primary	  analyses,	  secondary	  analyses	  demonstrated	  that	  psychological	  immersion	  was	  significantly	  correlated	  with	  higher	  negative	  and	  lower	  positive	  affect,	  and	  with	  greater	  self	  portrayal	  concerns	  (but	  only	  for	  the	  social	  anticipation	  task),	  accounting	  for	  unique	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Introduction	  
Cognitive	  models	  of	  social	  anxiety	  
Social	  Anxiety	  Disorder	  (SAD)	  is	  characterized	  by	  fear	  of	  negative	  evaluation	  in	  social	  situations,	  leading	  to	  personal	  distress	  and	  dysfunction	  across	  a	  variety	  of	  life	  domains,	  often	  in	  large	  part	  because	  of	  socially	  anxious	  individuals’	  excessive	  avoidance	  of	  situations	  where	  social	  evaluation	  might	  occur.	  According	  to	  cognitive	  models	  of	  social	  anxiety	  (SA),	  upon	  entering	  an	  evaluative	  social	  situation,	  socially	  anxious	  individuals	  typically	  become	  hypervigilant	  to	  states	  of	  anxious	  arousal	  that	  are	  internally	  felt	  (e.g.,	  heart	  rate)	  or	  externally	  visible	  (e.g.,	  trembling,	  blushing),	  and	  fear	  negative	  evaluation	  by	  others	  who	  may	  perceive	  these	  signs	  of	  anxiety	  (Clark	  &	  Wells,	  1995).	  For	  individuals	  with	  SAD,	  a	  discrepancy	  exists	  between	  the	  expectations	  they	  believe	  others	  have	  of	  them	  in	  social	  situations	  and	  their	  perceived	  abilities	  to	  meet	  those	  expectations	  (Rapee	  &	  Heimberg,	  1997;	  Alden,	  Bieling	  &	  Wallace,	  1994;	  Wallace	  &	  Alden,	  1995).	  	  A	  model	  of	  core	  fears	  in	  SAD	  has	  been	  developed	  by	  Moscovitch	  (2009)	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  precisely	  identify	  those	  aspects	  of	  self	  that	  are	  perceived	  to	  be	  inadequate	  for	  those	  with	  the	  disorder.	  Perceptions	  of	  having	  inadequate	  social	  skills	  and	  personality,	  being	  physically	  unattractive,	  and	  being	  unable	  to	  control	  and	  conceal	  signs	  of	  anxiety	  are	  hypothesized	  to	  differentiate	  the	  heterogeneous	  presentation	  of	  this	  disorder.	  The	  
Negative	  Self	  Portrayal	  Scale	  (NSPS;	  Moscovitch	  &	  Huyder,	  2011)	  was	  developed	  in	  order	  to	  measure	  these	  fears	  in	  clinical	  samples.	  Psychometric	  analyses	  determined	  that	  the	  four	  fears	  proposed	  in	  the	  Moscovitch	  model	  (2009)	  exhibit	  a	  3-­‐factor	  solution	  among	  initial	  samples	  of	  undergraduate	  students	  completing	  the	  NSPS,	  with	  the	  fear	  of	  being	  socially	  unskilled	  and	  having	  a	  flawed	  personality	  tapping	  into	  the	  same	  construct	  on	  the	  NSPS,	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which	  was	  labeled	  social	  incompetence	  (Moscovitch	  &	  Huyder,	  2011).	  This	  factor	  structure	  was	  later	  replicated	  in	  clinical	  and	  community	  samples	  (Moscovitch	  et	  al.,	  2013)	  Regardless	  of	  the	  precise	  aspect	  of	  concern,	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  fear	  of	  negative	  evaluation	  leads	  high	  SA	  individuals	  to	  focus	  their	  attention	  inward	  and	  enact	  a	  variety	  of	  safety	  behaviours,	  or	  strategies	  designed	  to	  attenuate	  the	  distressing	  emotional	  experience	  itself	  or	  to	  conceal	  their	  heightened	  state	  of	  anxiety	  from	  others	  (McManus,	  Sacadura,	  &	  Clark,	  2008).	  Socially	  anxious	  individuals	  tend	  to	  adopt	  an	  observer’s	  perspective	  (i.e.,	  that	  of	  their	  social	  partner)	  during	  social	  encounters,	  resulting	  in	  the	  perception	  that	  one’s	  anxious	  arousal	  is	  transparent	  to	  others.	  Partly	  due	  to	  the	  idiosyncratic	  mental	  representations	  of	  the	  self	  in	  SA,	  afflicted	  individuals	  overestimate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  their	  anxiety	  is	  visible	  to	  others,	  and	  the	  probability	  that	  others	  will	  judge	  them	  negatively	  for	  exhibiting	  anxiety	  (Clark	  &	  Wells,	  1995).	  Indeed,	  studies	  examining	  self	  and	  observer	  appraisals	  have	  generally	  concluded	  that	  individuals	  with	  SAD	  exaggerate	  the	  perceived	  visibility	  of	  their	  anxiety	  and	  negativity	  of	  their	  social	  performance	  relative	  to	  ratings	  provided	  by	  objective	  observers	  (Norton	  &	  Hope,	  2001;	  Rapee	  &	  Lim,	  1992).	  Moreover,	  high	  SA	  individuals’	  distorted	  self-­‐appraisals	  have	  been	  found	  to	  worsen	  as	  perceived	  standards	  of	  social	  performance	  become	  heightened	  or	  remain	  ambiguous	  in	  laboratory	  tasks,	  in	  comparison	  to	  when	  these	  standards	  are	  perceived	  as	  being	  low	  (Moscovitch	  &	  Hofmann,	  2007).	  In	  short,	  SA	  individuals	  believe	  that	  the	  way	  they	  feel	  during	  feared	  social	  interactions	  must	  reflect	  they	  way	  they	  appear	  to	  others	  (Papageorgiou	  &	  Wells,	  2002),	  and	  because	  what	  they	  feel	  is	  often	  personally	  deemed	  as	  being	  unacceptable	  to	  social	  evaluators,	  their	  tendency	  is	  to	  conceal	  outward	  expressions	  of	  anxious	  internal	  states	  in	  many	  kinds	  of	  evaluative	  social	  situations.	  Thus,	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although	  negative	  self-­‐appraisals	  are	  implicated	  in	  biased	  performance	  judgments,	  the	  context	  of	  the	  social	  interaction	  and,	  more	  specifically,	  perceived	  audience	  standards	  may	  moderate	  the	  nature	  of	  such	  judgments	  (Wallace	  &	  Alden,	  1997;	  Moscovitch	  &	  Hofmann,	  2007).	  	  	  
Negative	  biases	  in	  future-­‐	  and	  past-­‐oriented	  information	  processing	  	  As	  reviewed	  above,	  the	  lens	  through	  which	  socially	  anxious	  individuals	  process	  incoming	  social	  information	  tends	  to	  be	  fundamentally	  distorted	  by	  their	  negative	  self-­‐views.	  As	  a	  result,	  self-­‐critical	  beliefs	  are	  rarely	  challenged	  but,	  rather,	  tend	  to	  become	  strengthened	  over	  time,	  thereby	  perpetuating	  maladaptive	  cognitive,	  behavioural,	  and	  emotional	  responses	  to	  social	  events	  as	  they	  arise	  (see	  Hofmann,	  2007),	  and	  negatively	  impact	  both	  their	  expectations	  of	  future	  social	  events	  and	  their	  memories	  of	  past	  encounters	  (Chiupka,	  Moscovitch,	  &	  Bielak,	  2012).	  
Anticipatory	  anxiety	  is	  a	  form	  of	  future-­‐oriented	  worry,	  consisting	  of	  preparations	  for	  upcoming	  feared	  situations	  in	  which	  socially	  anxious	  individuals	  tend	  to	  ruminate	  about,	  and	  become	  fixated	  on,	  ways	  to	  escape	  or	  avoid	  a	  feared	  situation,	  or	  otherwise	  cope	  with	  upcoming	  social	  threat	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  might	  prevent	  their	  imagined	  catastrophic	  outcomes	  from	  occurring	  (e.g.,	  via	  self-­‐concealment	  efforts;	  see	  Moscovitch,	  2009;	  Moscovitch	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  Experimental	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  while	  anticipating	  social	  threat,	  socially	  anxious	  individuals	  generate	  more	  negative	  images	  of	  themselves	  from	  an	  observer	  perspective	  and	  experience	  more	  anticipatory	  anxiety	  than	  nonanxious	  controls	  (Hinrichsen	  &	  Clark,	  2003);	  unlike	  such	  controls,	  however,	  they	  do	  not	  also	  typically	  retrieve	  positive	  views	  of	  themselves	  that	  help	  to	  mitigate	  anxious	  reactions	  and	  catastrophic	  thinking	  in	  preparation	  of	  social	  encounters	  (Vassilopoulos,	  2008).	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Socially	  anxious	  individuals’	  processing	  of	  past-­‐oriented	  information	  also	  tends	  to	  be	  negatively	  skewed,	  as	  illustrated	  by	  research	  that	  has	  investigated	  autobiographical	  images	  and	  memories	  in	  high	  versus	  low	  socially	  anxious	  participants.	  As	  reviewed	  by	  Morgan	  (2010),	  autobiographical	  memories	  are	  products	  of	  iterative	  reconstructions	  of	  past	  events,	  melding	  bottom-­‐up	  encoding	  of	  new	  experiences	  with	  top-­‐down	  processes	  that	  organize	  such	  experiences	  in	  light	  of	  existing	  beliefs	  about	  the	  self.	  For	  individuals	  with	  SAD,	  negative	  social	  experiences	  tend	  to	  be	  salient	  and	  more	  easily	  remembered	  because	  they	  are	  compatible	  with	  individuals’	  existing	  self-­‐schemas.	  Studies	  have	  shown	  that	  compared	  with	  nonanxious	  controls,	  high	  SA	  individuals	  retrieve	  more	  negative	  than	  positive	  self-­‐images	  during	  social	  situations	  and	  that	  these	  images	  are	  often	  derived	  from	  autobiographical	  memories	  of	  negative	  social	  experiences	  (Moscovitch,	  Gavric,	  Merrifield,	  Bielak,	  &	  Moscovitch,	  2011).	  Additionally,	  socially	  anxious	  participants	  are	  able	  to	  access	  fewer	  positive	  autobiographical	  images	  which	  contain	  less	  elaborate	  episodic	  detail	  relative	  to	  controls	  (Moscovitch	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Experimental	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  simply	  instructing	  high	  SA	  individuals	  to	  hold	  a	  positive	  image	  of	  themselves	  in	  mind	  during	  social	  situations	  results	  in	  improved	  state	  self-­‐esteem,	  suggesting	  that	  although	  positive	  self-­‐imagery	  may	  be	  inherently	  less	  accessible	  to	  socially	  anxious	  individuals,	  they	  may	  be	  capable	  of	  retrieving	  such	  images	  with	  explicit	  effort	  and	  guided	  instruction	  (Stopa,	  Brown	  &	  Hirsch,	  2012).	  Individuals	  with	  SAD	  have	  also	  been	  found	  to	  use	  more	  self-­‐referential	  words	  and	  make	  fewer	  references	  to	  others	  in	  written	  autobiographical	  memory	  narratives,	  suggesting	  perhaps	  that	  self-­‐focused	  attention	  influences	  memory	  consolidation	  (Anderson,	  Goldin,	  Kurita	  &	  Gross,	  2008).	  Similarly,	  they	  tend	  to	  recall	  more	  self-­‐
	   5	  
referential	  memories	  (e.g.,	  their	  own	  cognitions	  and	  behaviour,	  from	  an	  observer’s	  perspective)	  (Morgan,	  2010).	  Finally,	  high	  SA	  individuals	  also	  differ	  from	  nonanxious	  controls	  in	  the	  meaning	  they	  attribute	  to	  past	  negative	  social	  events.	  For	  example,	  in	  comparison	  to	  controls,	  high	  SA	  individuals	  appraise	  both	  their	  own	  past	  social	  blunders	  and	  imagined	  hypothetical	  blunders	  as	  being	  more	  embarrassing,	  shameful,	  more	  likely	  to	  elicit	  negative	  responses	  from	  others,	  and	  more	  socially	  costly	  (Moscovitch,	  Rodebaugh,	  &	  Hesch,	  2012).	  	  
Rumination	  –	  excessive	  and	  maladaptive	  reflection	  upon	  negative	  emotional	  experiences	  –	  is	  implicated	  in	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  emotional	  disorders,	  including	  SAD.	  It	  is	  associated	  with	  increases	  in	  symptoms	  of	  anxiety	  and	  depression,	  and	  aggravates	  negative	  fixation	  on	  emotional	  problems	  (Nolen-­‐Hoeksema,	  Wisco,	  &	  Lyubomirksy,	  2008).	  In	  SAD	  specifically,	  rumination	  is	  a	  pervasive	  problem	  referred	  to	  as	  post	  event	  processing	  (PEP),	  a	  form	  of	  maladaptive	  problem-­‐solving	  consisting	  of	  the	  repetitive	  mental	  “replaying”	  of	  past	  negative	  social	  events	  (Morgan	  &	  Benerjee,	  2008),	  which	  exacerbates	  anxiety	  and	  negative	  beliefs	  about	  the	  self	  (Kocovski,	  Endler,	  Rector,	  &	  Flett,	  2005).	  Even	  when	  socially	  anxious	  individuals	  are	  not	  able	  to	  pinpoint	  what,	  specifically,	  went	  wrong	  in	  a	  social	  situation,	  they	  often	  engage	  in	  upward	  counterfactual	  thinking	  (UCT)	  and	  ruminate	  over	  their	  perceived	  mistakes	  and	  how	  a	  particular	  social	  encounter	  could	  have	  gone	  better.	  Investigations	  of	  this	  phenomenon	  have	  conceptualized	  UCT	  as	  a	  form	  of	  problem	  solving	  intended	  to	  overcome	  a	  deficit	  or	  need	  through	  the	  function	  of	  a	  negative-­‐feedback	  loop	  aimed	  towards	  achieving	  some	  elevated	  steady	  state	  (for	  example,	  an	  uncompromising	  positive	  appraisal	  of	  one’s	  social	  performance	  )(Epstude	  &	  Roese,	  2008).	  Considering	  high	  SA	  individuals’	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  potential	  costs	  of	  violating	  social	  standards	  (Moscovitch,	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Rodebaugh,	  &	  Hesch	  2012),	  this	  form	  of	  self-­‐reflection	  produces	  few	  limits	  on	  the	  negative	  appraisals	  that	  can	  be	  generated	  during	  the	  ruminative	  process.	  	  Thus,	  the	  extant	  literature	  indicates	  quite	  clearly	  that	  SA	  is	  associated	  with	  maladaptive	  anticipatory	  (future-­‐oriented)	  and	  ruminative	  (past-­‐oriented)	  self-­‐reflective	  information	  processing.	  These	  processes,	  in	  turn,	  reinforce	  negative	  self-­‐critical	  beliefs,	  drive	  symptoms	  of	  social	  anxiety	  and	  distress	  in	  social	  situations,	  and	  promote	  avoidance	  of	  and	  withdrawal	  from	  social	  encounters.	  
Cognitive	  reappraisal	  of	  negative	  thoughts	  and	  beliefs	  in	  SAD	  	  Cognitive	  reappraisal	  has	  long	  been	  a	  central	  component	  of	  cognitive	  behavioural	  therapy	  (CBT)	  for	  SAD	  and	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  essential	  for	  helping	  patients	  learn	  to	  challenge	  and	  modify	  self-­‐critical	  cognitions	  which,	  in	  turn,	  helps	  to	  down-­‐regulate	  the	  associated	  negative	  effects	  on	  emotions	  and	  behaviour	  (Hofmann,	  Heering,	  Sawyer,	  &	  Asani,	  2009).	  Reappraisal	  efforts	  may	  include,	  for	  example,	  helping	  individuals	  see	  that	  the	  likelihood	  and	  costs	  of	  negative	  evaluation	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  perceived	  social	  blunder	  are	  less	  extreme	  than	  they	  might	  initially	  believe.	  	  Despite	  the	  successes	  of	  CBT	  as	  a	  “gold	  standard”	  intervention	  for	  SAD,	  many	  patients	  do	  not	  respond	  adequately	  even	  after	  a	  full	  course	  of	  treatment	  (see	  Moscovitch	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  In	  one	  recent	  study,	  25	  outpatients	  with	  a	  principal	  diagnosis	  of	  SAD	  were	  distinguished	  as	  either	  treatment	  responders	  or	  non-­‐responders	  based	  on	  the	  symptom	  changes	  they	  exhibited	  (calculated	  according	  to	  the	  reliable	  change	  index;	  Jacobson	  &	  Truax,	  1991)	  during	  a	  standardized	  12-­‐session	  course	  of	  group	  CBT.	  Although	  both	  groups	  –	  i.e.,	  those	  ultimately	  classified	  as	  responders	  vs.	  nonresponders	  –	  began	  therapy	  with	  equivalent	  cognitive	  reappraisal	  (CR)	  skill	  sets,	  treatment	  responders	  reported	  significant	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gains	  in	  their	  acquisition	  and	  use	  of	  such	  skills	  by	  mid-­‐treatment,	  whereas	  non-­‐responders	  did	  not;	  moreover,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  individuals	  acquired	  and	  used	  CR	  skills	  from	  pre-­‐	  to	  mid-­‐treatment	  significantly	  predicted	  reductions	  in	  SA	  symptoms	  from	  pre-­‐	  to	  post-­‐treatment	  (Moscovitch	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  While	  these	  findings	  suggest	  that	  the	  early	  acquisition	  of	  CR	  skills	  during	  CBT	  may	  be	  fundamental	  to	  full-­‐length	  treatment	  success,	  they	  also	  raise	  an	  important	  empirical	  question:	  Why	  might	  treatment	  responders	  with	  SAD	  learn	  to	  acquire	  such	  skills	  successfully	  as	  a	  result	  of	  CBT,	  while	  non-­‐responders	  do	  not,	  despite	  similar	  pretreatment	  demographic	  and	  diagnostic	  characteristics	  across	  the	  two	  groups	  and	  identical	  exposure	  to	  a	  “gold	  standard”	  treatment	  regimen?	  One	  possibility,	  which	  we	  began	  to	  test	  in	  the	  present	  study,	  is	  that	  before	  individuals	  with	  emotional	  difficulties	  or	  disorders	  can	  learn	  to	  adopt	  reappraisal	  techniques	  and	  challenge	  or	  modify	  the	  content	  of	  their	  cognitions,	  they	  must	  first	  learn	  to	  utilize	  meta-­‐cognitive	  techniques	  that	  focus	  on	  altering	  their	  
relationship	  with	  their	  own	  thoughts	  and	  beliefs.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  there	  are	  significant	  individual	  differences	  in	  people’s	  abilities	  to	  use	  such	  techniques,	  even	  amongst	  clinical	  samples	  who	  do	  not	  receive	  formal	  instruction.	  	  Meta-­‐cognitive	  approaches	  can	  be	  conceptualized	  as	  pre-­‐requisites	  to	  successful	  cognitive	  restructuring	  in	  cognitive-­‐based	  (CB)	  therapies,	  especially	  during	  times	  of	  emotional	  distress,	  when	  latent	  negative	  schema	  are	  activated	  and	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  accessible	  for	  retrieval,	  as	  discussed	  by	  Brewin	  (2006)	  and	  others	  (e.g.,	  Craske	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Meta-­‐cognitive	  processes	  have	  gained	  attention	  in	  recent	  studies	  that	  have	  attempted	  to	  operationalize	  and	  better	  understand	  the	  ways	  that	  individuals	  think	  about	  and	  relate	  to	  their	  own	  cognitions	  during	  self-­‐reflection,	  and	  how	  such	  processes	  may	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impact	  emotional	  outcomes.	  Self-­‐distancing	  has	  emerged	  as	  one	  such	  meta-­‐cognitive	  process.	  	  
Self	  distancing	  and	  emotion	  regulation	  The	  construct	  of	  self-­‐distancing	  (SD)	  emerged	  from	  a	  theory	  of	  levels	  of	  psychological	  construals,	  which	  was	  originally	  developed	  by	  Trope	  and	  Liberman	  (2003),	  and	  later	  applied	  to	  psychological	  distancing	  (Trope	  &	  Liberman,	  2010).	  They	  hypothesized	  that	  individuals	  could	  depart	  from	  a	  self-­‐centered,	  “in-­‐the-­‐moment”	  perspective	  of	  their	  self,	  environment,	  and	  objects	  within	  that	  environment	  (operationalized	  as	  low-­‐level	  construals),	  and	  adopt	  hypothetical	  present	  and	  future	  alternatives,	  as	  well	  as	  reconstructions	  of	  past	  events	  and	  what	  they	  represent	  about	  the	  self	  and	  others	  (operationalized	  as	  high-­‐level	  construals).	  The	  implication	  of	  this	  theory	  is	  that	  individuals	  can	  presumably	  choose	  consciously	  to	  adopt	  either	  low	  or	  high	  level	  construals	  by	  either	  placing	  themselves	  into	  a	  psychologically	  immersed	  (PI)	  perspective,	  wherein	  their	  mental	  representations	  are	  immediate,	  present-­‐oriented,	  and	  enmeshed	  with	  their	  sense	  of	  self,	  or	  opt	  to	  take	  a	  psychologically	  distanced	  (PD)	  perspective,	  in	  which	  their	  mental	  representations	  of	  themselves,	  others	  and	  the	  situation	  in	  which	  they	  are	  engaged	  are	  more	  removed	  (or	  distant)	  in	  time,	  space,	  or	  visual	  perspective.	  	  Recently,	  Kross	  and	  Ayduk	  (2011)	  have	  conceptualized	  self-­‐distancing	  (operationalized	  as	  a	  continuous	  variable	  with	  PD	  and	  PI	  lying	  on	  opposite	  extremes)	  as	  a	  construct	  that	  differentiates	  adaptive	  vs.	  maladaptive	  self-­‐reflection.	  They	  argued	  that	  PD	  enhances	  the	  reappraisal	  of	  autobiographical	  memories,	  whereas	  PI	  enhances	  the	  
recounting	  of	  such	  memories.	  Reappraisal	  of	  memories	  is	  hypothesized	  to	  enhance	  individuals’	  positive	  affective	  and	  cognitive	  outcomes	  following	  self-­‐reflection	  by	  allowing	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them	  to	  re-­‐evaluate	  negative	  experiences	  in	  ways	  that	  reduce	  their	  negative	  impact,	  which	  is	  often	  due	  to	  overvaluations	  of	  certain	  ideas	  over	  others.	  Conversely,	  the	  recounting	  of	  memories,	  theorized	  to	  be	  a	  product	  of	  PI,	  is	  thought	  to	  constrict	  focus	  during	  self-­‐reflection,	  preventing	  individuals	  from	  taking	  a	  “big	  picture”	  view	  of	  autobiographical	  memories,	  focusing	  on	  their	  concrete	  and	  emotionally-­‐laden	  characteristics	  instead.	  This	  latter	  form	  of	  self-­‐reflection	  is	  akin	  to	  post-­‐event	  processing,	  which	  is	  known	  to	  exacerbate	  emotional	  distress	  in	  socially	  anxious	  samples,	  as	  reviewed	  above.	  In	  Kross	  and	  Ayduk’s	  experimental	  studies,	  participants	  are	  typically	  asked	  to	  visualize	  personal	  experiences	  as	  reoccurring	  while	  viewing	  them	  either	  from	  their	  own	  eyes	  (the	  PI	  perspective),	  or	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  neutral	  observer,	  or	  a	  “fly	  on	  the	  wall”	  (the	  PD	  perspective).	  Ayduk	  and	  Kross	  (2010)	  demonstrated	  that	  individuals	  who	  adopted	  the	  PD	  perspective,	  in	  comparison	  to	  individuals	  who	  adopted	  the	  PI	  perspective,	  experienced	  less	  emotional	  and	  physiological	  reactivity	  to	  negative	  events	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  and	  were	  able	  to	  buffer	  themselves	  from	  the	  experience	  of	  negative	  affect	  in	  the	  long-­‐term.	  Constructs	  akin	  to	  self-­‐distancing	  have	  been	  introduced	  and	  investigated	  across	  several	  different	  areas	  of	  study	  within	  the	  field	  of	  clinical	  psychology,	  but	  they	  are	  all	  essentially	  analogous	  to	  one	  another	  in	  their	  descriptions	  of	  a	  common	  process.	  For	  example,	  Teasdale	  et	  al.	  (2002),	  as	  well	  as	  others,	  have	  written	  extensively	  about	  the	  process	  of	  decentering,	  in	  which	  individuals	  consciously	  shift	  their	  cognitive	  set	  in	  order	  to	  depart	  from	  personally	  identifying	  with	  negative	  events	  (e.g.,	  memories,	  thoughts	  about	  the	  self,	  emotions,	  etc.)	  and,	  instead,	  to	  perceive	  them	  as	  basic	  products	  of	  the	  mind	  within	  a	  sea	  of	  one’s	  limited	  awareness.	  Similarly,	  cognitive	  fusion	  (Luoma	  &	  Hayes,	  1999)	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  entanglement	  with	  evaluative	  thought,	  wherein	  the	  outcomes	  or	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interpretations	  of	  an	  experience	  are	  based	  on	  personal,	  verbally-­‐mediated	  attributions	  of	  that	  experience,	  occurring	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  recognition	  that	  such	  attributions	  are	  unique	  products	  of	  the	  particular	  frame	  of	  mind	  (relational	  frame)	  at	  which	  one	  has	  arbitrarily	  arrived	  (either	  consciously	  or	  unconsciously).	  This	  relational	  frame	  is	  constantly	  in	  flux,	  and	  is	  unknowable	  in	  some	  ways.	  Therefore,	  according	  to	  Luoma	  and	  Hayes	  (1999),	  although	  the	  verbally	  mediated	  attributions	  of	  events	  at	  times	  seem	  uncompromisingly	  true,	  they	  are,	  in	  fact,	  open	  to	  re-­‐examination	  and	  disconfirmation	  through	  the	  process	  of	  cognitive	  restructuring,	  but	  only	  if	  cognitive	  defusion	  can	  be	  achieved.	  These	  various	  definitions	  for	  the	  perspective	  one	  adopts	  when	  self-­‐reflecting	  can	  be	  grouped	  together	  as	  forms	  of	  meta-­‐cognitive	  awareness,	  in	  that	  they	  involve	  the	  common	  process	  of	  consciously	  monitoring	  one’s	  streams	  of	  cognitions,	  an	  awareness	  of	  that	  monitoring,	  an	  awareness	  of	  that	  awareness,	  and	  so	  on,	  without	  arrival	  at	  any	  particular	  “meaning”	  or	  “truth”	  behind	  the	  process,	  such	  that	  one	  maintains	  an	  objective	  distance	  from	  the	  cognitions	  and	  their	  meaning	  without	  becoming	  fused	  to	  them.	  	  Commonalities	  between	  CBT	  and	  mindfulness-­‐based	  treatment	  protocols	  in	  their	  focus	  on	  metacognitive	  processes	  have	  aided	  in	  bridging	  the	  gap	  between	  so-­‐called	  second	  and	  third	  wave	  cognitive-­‐behavioural	  therapies	  (Hofmann	  &	  Asmundson,	  2008).	  Like	  other	  emotional	  disorders,	  SAD	  is	  characterized	  by	  negative	  thoughts/beliefs,	  images,	  memories,	  and	  other	  types	  of	  negative	  mental	  self-­‐representations	  becoming	  easily	  accessible	  during	  times	  of	  negative	  emotionality.	  Despite	  the	  induction	  of	  new	  positive	  self-­‐representations	  during	  CBT	  (for	  example,	  via	  successful	  implementation	  of	  cognitive	  restructuring,	  behavioural	  experiments,	  and	  similar	  techniques	  designed	  to	  challenge	  and	  modify	  negative	  self-­‐schemas),	  Brewin’s	  (2006)	  retrieval	  competition	  hypothesis	  states	  that	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maladaptive	  schemas	  remain	  latent	  within	  individuals	  and	  are	  retrieved	  more	  readily	  than	  positive	  schema	  during	  negative	  mood	  states.	  Subsequently,	  CR	  during	  CBT	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  most	  effective	  at	  treating	  emotional	  disorders	  when	  it	  teaches	  individuals	  to	  develop	  alternative	  mental	  representations	  during	  times	  of	  heightened	  emotionality.	  Related	  to	  this,	  self-­‐regulation	  of	  negative	  affect	  requires	  meta-­‐cognitive	  awareness	  –	  the	  realization	  that	  one	  has	  entered	  a	  negative	  mood	  state	  and	  one’s	  mental	  representations	  of	  self	  are	  susceptible	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  latent	  negative	  schema.	  Proponents	  of	  CBT	  agree	  that	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  meta-­‐cognitive	  awareness,	  individuals	  must	  bring	  their	  experience	  into	  full	  view	  and	  “step	  back”	  from	  it,	  observing	  their	  thoughts	  without	  over-­‐identifying	  with	  their	  meaning	  (Brewin,	  2006).	  Psychological	  distancing	  is	  one	  method	  to	  “step	  back.”	  Thus,	  mindfulness	  approaches	  (including	  meta-­‐cognitive	  awareness	  and	  self-­‐distancing)	  have	  been	  suggested	  to	  ameliorate	  the	  rigid	  application	  of	  emotion	  regulation	  (ER)	  strategies	  by	  allowing	  individuals	  to	  reflect	  on	  the	  efficacy	  of	  their	  coping	  strategies	  and	  to	  consider	  using	  alternative	  methods.	  One	  SA-­‐specific	  hurdle	  to	  achieving	  this	  flexibility	  in	  using	  ER	  strategies	  pertains	  to	  socially	  anxious	  individuals’	  high	  levels	  of	  self-­‐focused	  attention	  during	  social	  encounters,	  which	  worsens	  their	  information	  processing	  biases	  (Baer,	  2009).	  In	  SAD,	  fusion	  with	  the	  observer	  perspective	  during	  self-­‐focused	  attention	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  activate	  “hot”	  fear-­‐related	  cognitive	  networks	  (often	  containing	  maladaptive	  schema),	  leading	  to	  the	  use	  of	  entrenched	  and	  automatic	  action	  tendencies	  (e.g.,	  avoidance	  and	  safety	  behaviours)	  to	  cope	  with	  intense	  emotion	  (Kross,	  Ayduk,	  &	  Mischel,	  2005).	  As	  a	  consequence,	  low-­‐level,	  concrete	  self-­‐construals	  become	  potentiated	  at	  the	  consequence	  of	  higher-­‐level	  self-­‐construals.	  In	  such	  a	  state,	  conscious	  control	  of	  information	  processing	  is	  undermined	  by	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the	  automaticity	  of	  the	  emotional	  control	  system,	  producing	  the	  maladaptive	  ER	  strategies	  exhibited	  by	  individuals	  with	  SAD.	  Self-­‐focused	  attention,	  however,	  need	  not	  necessarily	  result	  in	  negative	  outcomes,	  and	  is	  sometimes	  a	  practiced	  strategy	  in	  certain	  forms	  of	  mindfulness	  meditations.	  Indeed,	  negative	  outcomes	  of	  self-­‐focused	  attention,	  and	  their	  hypothesized	  relations	  to	  SAD,	  may	  be	  conceptualized,	  in	  part,	  as	  a	  product	  of	  psychological	  immersion.	  An	  immersed	  psychological	  perspective,	  involving	  low-­‐level	  construals	  about	  the	  self,	  results	  in	  an	  inability	  to	  observe	  thoughts	  and	  emotions	  in	  a	  distanced	  manner,	  and	  is	  associated	  with	  negative	  outcomes,	  as	  reviewed	  above	  (Kross	  &	  Ayduk,	  2011).	  
Research	  questions	  and	  hypotheses	  In	  the	  present	  experimental	  study,	  high	  vs.	  low	  socially	  anxious	  individuals	  were	  brought	  to	  the	  laboratory	  and	  instructed,	  first,	  to	  recollect	  a	  past	  social	  blunder	  and,	  subsequently,	  to	  anticipate	  an	  upcoming	  social	  interaction	  with	  an	  unfamiliar	  partner.	  Participants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  reflect	  on	  these	  past	  and	  future	  events	  in	  either	  a	  psychologically	  distanced	  or	  immersed	  manner.	  We	  wished	  to	  investigate	  (a)	  whether	  psychological	  distancing	  would	  promote	  more	  positive	  (or	  less	  negative)	  appraisals	  of	  past	  blunders	  relative	  to	  psychological	  immersion,	  and	  (b)	  whether	  high	  socially	  anxious	  individuals	  would	  show	  a	  potentiated	  response	  to	  the	  distancing	  or	  immersion	  instructions	  relative	  to	  their	  low	  socially	  anxious	  counterparts.	  To	  our	  knowledge,	  no	  previous	  studies	  have	  been	  conducted	  to	  examine	  these	  particular	  questions.	  We	  predicted	  that	  both	  high	  and	  low	  socially	  anxious	  participants	  would	  report	  higher	  negative	  affect,	  lower	  positive	  affect,	  more	  negative	  cognitions	  about	  the	  self,	  and	  greater	  behavioural	  avoidance	  in	  the	  psychologically	  immersed	  experimental	  condition	  in	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comparison	  to	  the	  psychologically	  distanced	  condition.	  Moreover,	  we	  hypothesized	  that	  among	  high	  socially	  anxious	  participants,	  those	  assigned	  to	  reflect	  in	  a	  self-­‐immersed	  manner	  would	  exhibit	  disproportionally	  higher	  ratings	  of	  negative	  affect,	  more	  negative	  self-­‐beliefs,	  and	  greater	  behavioural	  avoidance	  than	  those	  assigned	  to	  reflect	  in	  a	  self-­‐distanced	  manner,	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  experimental	  manipulation	  on	  low	  socially	  anxious	  participants.	  As	  such,	  we	  predicted	  that	  immersed,	  high	  socially	  anxious	  individuals	  would	  report	  the	  most	  negative	  affect,	  negative	  self-­‐beliefs	  and	  behavioural	  avoidance,	  while	  distanced,	  low	  socially	  anxious	  individuals	  would	  report	  the	  least.	  These	  predictions	  are	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  1.	  	  Figure	  1	  
Predicted	  levels	  of	  affect,	  cognitions	  and	  behavioural	  avoidance	  among	  high	  and	  low	  socially	  
anxious	  participants	  within	  each	  experimental	  condition	  
	  
Low	   High	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Methods	  
Participants	  A	  total	  of	  76	  students	  were	  recruited	  from	  the	  University	  of	  Waterloo	  (UW)	  undergraduate	  subject	  pool	  and	  designated	  as	  high	  or	  low	  socially	  anxious	  using	  the	  Social	  
Phobia	  Inventory	  (SPIN;	  Connor	  et	  al.	  2000)	  in	  the	  manner	  described	  in	  the	  Measures	  section,	  below.	  Participants	  were	  compensated	  with	  course	  credit	  for	  participating	  in	  a	  45-­‐minute	  study.	  Participants	  completed	  the	  SPIN	  as	  well	  as	  a	  number	  of	  other	  questionnaires	  administered	  by	  UW	  researchers	  during	  mass	  testing	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  semester,	  and	  only	  individuals	  designated	  as	  “low”	  or	  “high”	  socially	  anxious	  were	  eligible	  to	  participate.	  Individuals	  who	  were	  invited	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  study	  were	  unaware	  of	  these	  specific	  eligibility	  criteria.	  Table	  1	  presents	  information	  on	  the	  demographic	  characteristics	  of	  the	  study	  sample.	  	  Table	  1.	  Demographic	  Characteristics	  of	  the	  Study	  Sample	  (N=76)	  
Demographic	  Characteristics	  
Age	  (mean/SD)	   20.6	  (1.4)	  
%	  Females	   64.5%	  
Cultural	  or	  Ethnic	  Background	  (by	  percent)	  	  	  	  Chinese	   42.1%	  	  	  	  Caucasian/White	   17.1%	  	  	  	  East	  Indian	   7.9%	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  Korean	   6.6%	  	  	  	  Asian	  (other)	  	   6.6%	  	  	  	  Declined	  to	  answer	   6.6%	  	  	  	  Other	  	   13.1%	  
Marital	  Status	  (by	  percent)	  	  	  	  Single	   42.1%	  	  	  	  Exclusively	  dating	   30.3%	  	  	  	  Causally	  dating	   7.9%	  	  	  	  Other	   19.7%	  
	  
Measures	  
Social	  Phobia	  Inventory	  (SPIN;	  Connor	  et	  al.	  2000)	  The	  SPIN	  is	  composed	  of	  17-­‐items	  that	  participants	  rate	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  0	  (“not	  at	  all”)	  to	  4	  (“extremely”).	  Items	  comprise	  ratings	  of	  fear,	  avoidance	  and	  discomfort	  in	  social	  situations,	  and	  are	  used	  to	  assess	  severity	  of	  social	  anxiety	  symptoms.	  Individuals	  with	  scores	  equal	  to	  or	  lower	  than	  12	  were	  designated	  as	  “low”	  socially	  anxious,	  and	  individuals	  with	  scores	  equal	  to	  or	  greater	  than	  30	  were	  designated	  as	  “high”	  socially	  anxious.	  These	  are	  accepted	  cutoff	  scores	  that	  have	  been	  used	  in	  previous	  studies	  for	  creating	  analogue	  samples	  of	  high	  and	  low	  SA	  participants	  (see	  Moscovitch,	  Rodebaugh,	  &	  Hesch,	  2012).	  The	  SPIN	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  possess	  excellent	  psychometric	  properties,	  including	  high	  reliability	  and	  validity	  in	  measuring	  symptoms	  severity,	  and	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  intervention	  (Antony,	  Coons,	  McCabe,	  Ashbaugh,	  &	  Swinson,	  2006).	  In	  the	  present	  study,	  Cronbach’s	  alpha	  was	  0.96.	  This	  measure	  is	  available	  for	  review	  in	  Appendix	  A.	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Positive	  and	  Negative	  Affect	  Schedule	  (PANAS;	  Watson,	  Clark	  &	  Tellegen,	  1988)	  The	  PANAS	  is	  comprised	  of	  10	  items	  measuring	  current	  positive	  affect	  (PA)	  and	  10	  items	  measuring	  current	  negative	  affect	  (NA).	  Participants	  rated	  items	  such	  as	  “interested”	  or	  “upset”	  on	  a	  5-­‐point	  scale,	  ranging	  from	  1	  (“very	  slightly,	  or	  not	  at	  all”)	  to	  5	  (“extremely”).	  The	  PANAS	  is	  a	  widely	  used	  measure	  of	  state	  affect	  that	  has	  demonstrated	  very	  strong	  psychometric	  properties	  in	  previous	  studies	  (Tuccitto,	  Giacobbi,	  &	  Leite,	  2010).	  Cronbach’s	  alpha	  for	  the	  PANAS	  ranged	  from	  0.81	  to	  0.92	  across	  its	  administration	  in	  the	  present	  study.	  This	  measure	  is	  available	  for	  review	  in	  Appendix	  B.	  
Subjective	  Units	  of	  Distress	  Scale	  (SUDS)	  SUDS	  ratings	  were	  reported	  by	  participants	  alongside	  their	  PANAS	  ratings	  throughout	  the	  study.	  Participants	  rated	  how	  anxious	  they	  felt	  at	  various	  time	  points	  (described	  below)	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  0	  to	  100,	  where	  0	  corresponds	  to	  “no	  anxiety	  at	  all”	  and	  100	  to	  “the	  greatest	  anxiety	  imaginable”.	  This	  measure	  is	  available	  for	  review	  in	  Appendix	  C.	  
Negative	  Self-­‐Portrayal	  Scale	  (NSPS;	  Moscovitch	  &	  Huyder,	  2011)	  The	  NSPS	  is	  a	  27-­‐item	  instrument	  that	  measures	  several	  areas	  of	  self-­‐portrayal	  concern	  common	  to	  social	  anxiety,	  rated	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  (“not	  at	  all	  concerned”)	  to	  5	  (“extremely	  concerned”).	  Items	  correspond	  to	  three	  broad	  nonorthogonal	  factors	  of	  personal	  concern	  regarding,	  a)	  revealing	  signs	  of	  anxiety,	  b)	  appearing	  socially	  incompetent	  (including	  deficits	  in	  social	  skills	  and	  personality),	  and	  c)	  being	  physically	  unattractive.	  Three	  NSPS	  subscales	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  the	  items	  corresponding	  with	  each	  of	  the	  3	  factors,	  which	  can	  also	  be	  summed	  together	  to	  produce	  a	  total	  score.	  Total	  NSPS	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scores	  were	  used	  in	  the	  present	  study.	  Scale	  developers	  reported	  that	  this	  measure	  demonstrates	  strong	  internal	  consistency	  and	  convergent	  validity.	  Cronbach’s	  alpha	  values	  ranged	  from	  0.91	  to	  0.96	  in	  the	  present	  study.	  This	  measure	  is	  available	  for	  review	  in	  Appendix	  D.	  
Nonreactivity	  to	  Inner	  Experiences	  subscale	  of	  the	  Five	  Facets	  of	  Mindfulness	  
Questionnaire	  (FFMQ;	  Baer,	  Smith,	  Hopkins,	  Krietemeyer,	  &	  Toney,	  2006)	  The	  FFMQ	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  one’s	  general	  tendency	  to	  remain	  mindful	  in	  daily	  life.	  It	  has	  been	  applied	  to	  the	  measurement	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  mindfulness	  interventions,	  and	  their	  impact	  on	  well-­‐being	  and	  symptom	  reduction	  in	  various	  psychological	  disorders,	  including	  anxiety.	  It	  has	  shown	  good	  internal	  consistency	  and	  strong	  concurrent	  validity	  with	  measures	  of	  emotional	  intelligence,	  thought	  suppression,	  and	  openness	  to	  experience,	  among	  other	  variables	  related	  to	  mindfulness	  (Baer	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  The	  nonreactivity	  to	  inner	  
experiences	  factor	  of	  the	  FFMQ	  was	  administered	  in	  the	  present	  study.	  It	  is	  composed	  of	  7	  items	  that	  measure	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  individuals	  allow	  various	  thoughts	  and	  feelings	  to	  freely	  enter	  and	  leave	  awareness,	  without	  ruminating	  about	  their	  content	  or	  suppressing	  them	  (Baer,	  2009).	  As	  such,	  this	  construct	  also	  corresponds	  with	  the	  conceptualization	  of	  
self-­‐distancing	  described	  in	  the	  Introduction	  above	  (for	  a	  review,	  see	  Kross	  &	  Ayduk,	  2008).	  Ratings	  are	  made	  on	  a	  5-­‐point	  scale,	  from	  1	  (“never	  or	  very	  rarely	  true”)	  to	  5	  (“very	  often	  or	  always	  true”),	  with	  the	  wording	  of	  items	  modified	  from	  the	  original	  scale	  to	  measure	  state	  (rather	  than	  trait)	  mindfulness	  during	  the	  experiment	  (e.g.	  “I	  [was	  able	  to]	  watch	  my	  feelings	  without	  getting	  lost	  in	  them”).	  Cronbach’s	  alpha	  ranged	  from	  0.87	  to	  0.88	  in	  the	  present	  study.	  This	  measure	  is	  available	  for	  review	  in	  Appendix	  E.	  
Visual	  Perspective	  (VP)	  	  
	   18	  
	   On	  a	  6-­‐point	  scale,	  participants	  rated	  the	  visual	  perspective	  (VP)	  with	  which	  they	  viewed	  their	  past	  social	  blunder	  or	  imagined	  the	  upcoming	  social	  task.	  The	  scale	  ranged	  from	  -­‐3	  (“entirely	  looking	  through	  my	  own	  eyes”)	  to	  +3	  (“entirely	  observing	  myself	  from	  an	  external	  point	  of	  view”).	  This	  measure	  is	  available	  for	  review	  in	  Appendix	  F.	  
Procedure	  	   Participants	  arriving	  to	  the	  lab	  were	  instructed	  to	  sit	  comfortably	  in	  a	  chair	  at	  a	  desk	  with	  a	  flat	  screen	  computer	  monitor	  and	  keyboard	  in	  front	  of	  them.	  An	  experimenter	  sitting	  next	  to	  the	  participants	  provided	  them	  with	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  experiment	  and	  then	  instructed	  them	  to	  complete	  an	  information	  and	  consent	  form	  approved	  by	  the	  UW	  Office	  of	  Research	  Ethics.	  Subsequently,	  participants	  provided	  baseline	  ratings	  on	  both	  the	  PANAS	  and	  SUDS	  scales.	  	  	   The	  experimenter	  then	  instructed	  participants	  to	  recall	  a	  specific	  episodic	  memory	  of	  a	  recent	  social	  blunder	  they	  experienced	  which	  happened	  at	  a	  particular	  time	  and	  place	  and	  to	  rate	  from	  0-­‐100	  how	  distressing	  it	  was	  for	  them.	  A	  blunder	  was	  defined	  as	  any	  recent	  social	  experience	  in	  which	  participants	  did	  or	  said	  something	  that	  did	  not	  go	  the	  way	  they	  would	  have	  liked.	  Only	  social	  blunders	  that	  elicited	  subjective	  distress	  ratings	  of	  40	  points	  or	  higher	  at	  the	  time	  of	  their	  occurrence	  were	  accepted	  by	  the	  experimenter.	  Participants	  who	  initially	  recalled	  a	  social	  blunder	  that	  elicited	  lower	  levels	  of	  distress	  were	  encouraged	  to	  think	  of	  another,	  more	  distressing	  example	  before	  proceeding.	  Participants	  then	  estimated	  the	  date	  of	  occurrence	  of	  their	  chosen	  blunder.	  	   Next,	  participants	  completed	  a	  self-­‐reflection	  exercise	  that	  was	  designed	  to	  resemble	  the	  experimental	  procedure	  and	  manipulation	  that	  has	  been	  used	  by	  Kross	  and	  Ayduk	  (2005,	  2008)	  in	  their	  previous	  studies	  on	  self-­‐distancing.	  Participants	  were	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directed	  to	  face	  the	  computer	  screen	  where	  self-­‐reflection	  instructions	  were	  visible.	  They	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  reflect	  in	  either	  a	  self-­‐immersed	  or	  self-­‐distanced	  manner	  by	  use	  of	  a	  random	  number	  generator.	  In	  the	  self-­‐immersed	  condition,	  participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  think	  and	  write	  about	  the	  past	  social	  blunder	  as	  if	  they	  could	  see	  it	  happening	  
through	  their	  own	  eyes,	  as	  if	  they	  had	  a	  first-­‐person	  perspective	  of	  the	  experience	  (see	  Appendix	  G).	  In	  the	  self-­‐distanced	  condition,	  participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  think	  and	  write	  about	  the	  past	  social	  blunder	  as	  if	  they	  could	  see	  it	  happening	  from	  the	  visual	  
perspective	  of	  a	  fly	  on	  the	  wall,	  as	  if	  they	  had	  a	  third-­‐person	  perspective	  of	  the	  experience	  (see	  Appendix	  H).	  In	  each	  experimental	  condition,	  participants	  were	  provided	  with	  an	  example	  of	  how	  this	  perspective	  would	  be	  utilized	  if	  the	  experimenter	  were	  to	  reflect	  on	  a	  
non-­‐social	  blunder.	  	   The	  self-­‐reflection	  exercise	  was	  presented	  in	  three	  phases,	  each	  of	  which	  was	  timed,	  with	  two	  minutes	  allotted	  for	  the	  first	  phase	  and	  three	  minutes	  for	  phases	  2	  and	  3.	  The	  computer	  was	  programmed	  to	  progress	  to	  the	  next	  phase	  automatically	  when	  time	  in	  each	  phase	  had	  elapsed.	  During	  the	  first	  phase,	  participants	  were	  simply	  instructed	  to	  concentrate	  on	  their	  reflection	  in	  a	  small,	  round	  standing	  mirror	  (positioned	  below	  the	  computer	  monitor	  and	  above	  the	  keyboard)	  while	  bringing	  to	  mind	  a	  past	  social	  blunder	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  was	  consistent	  with	  their	  experimental	  condition.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  mirror	  was	  to	  help	  elicit	  self-­‐focused	  attention	  during	  self-­‐reflection.	  In	  the	  second	  phase,	  participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  write	  about	  what	  happened	  during	  their	  recalled	  blunder.	  Finally,	  in	  phase	  3,	  participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  analyze	  their	  feelings	  and	  write	  about	  the	  event	  in	  order	  to	  try	  to	  understand	  why	  it	  may	  have	  happened	  the	  way	  that	  it	  did.	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During	  the	  self-­‐reflection	  exercise,	  participants	  were	  left	  alone	  in	  the	  experimental	  room.	  They	  typed	  their	  narratives	  directly	  onto	  the	  computer	  screen.	  	   Following	  this	  self-­‐reflection	  exercise,	  participants	  provided	  a	  SUDS	  rating,	  and	  completed	  the	  PANAS,	  NSPS,	  the	  non-­‐reactivity	  subscale	  of	  the	  FFMQ,	  and	  a	  VP	  rating.	  Participants	  were	  then	  given	  a	  three-­‐minute	  rest,	  in	  which	  they	  were	  told	  to	  sit	  quietly	  and	  relax.	  They	  were	  then	  instructed	  to	  provide	  another	  set	  of	  ratings	  of	  the	  PANAS	  and	  SUDS.	  	  	   Next,	  the	  experimenter	  returned	  and	  explained	  that	  in	  a	  few	  minutes,	  participants	  would	  be	  having	  a	  “first	  meeting”	  type	  of	  conversation	  with	  another	  student	  who	  was	  completing	  the	  same	  study	  in	  an	  adjacent	  room,	  after	  which	  they	  would	  both	  make	  evaluations	  of	  how	  positive	  an	  impression	  each	  made	  on	  the	  other	  (in	  reality,	  there	  was	  no	  other	  student	  and	  no	  interaction	  would	  actually	  be	  occurring).	  The	  experimenter	  then	  left	  the	  room,	  and	  participants	  completed	  the	  same	  3-­‐phase	  self-­‐reflection	  exercise	  described	  above	  with	  instructions	  manipulated	  in	  a	  manner	  consistent	  with	  the	  same	  condition	  to	  which	  they	  had	  been	  randomized	  before	  (self-­‐immersed	  vs.	  self-­‐distanced;	  see	  Appendix	  I	  and	  Appendix	  J,	  respectively),	  but	  this	  time	  focusing	  on	  the	  upcoming	  interaction.	  	  	   Following	  this	  exercise,	  participants	  completed	  the	  SUDS,	  the	  PANAS,	  NSPS,	  the	  
non-­‐reactivity	  subscale	  of	  the	  FFMQ,	  and	  a	  VP	  rating	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  anticipated	  interaction.	  Finally,	  they	  provided	  ratings	  of	  how	  much	  they	  were	  looking	  forward	  to	  the	  upcoming	  social	  task,	  and	  a	  rating	  of	  how	  much	  they	  were	  willing	  to	  go	  through	  with	  the	  upcoming	  social	  task	  (see	  Appendix	  K).	  Following	  this,	  the	  experimenter	  returned	  to	  explain	  that	  there	  would	  be	  no	  social	  interaction	  task	  and	  a	  full	  debriefing	  ensured.	  Any	  remaining	  questions	  about	  the	  study	  were	  answered,	  and	  the	  participation	  credit	  was	  administered.	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Results	  
Preliminary	  analyses	  An	  independent-­‐samples	  t-­‐test	  indicated	  that	  participants	  randomized	  to	  the	  two	  conditions	  did	  not	  differ	  in	  endorsed	  social	  anxiety	  symptoms	  on	  the	  SPIN	  (t(74)	  =	  -­‐.26,	  p	  =.	  80),	  the	  distress	  they	  experienced	  during	  the	  occurrence	  of	  their	  recalled	  social	  blunder	  (t(74)	  =.50,	  p	  =	  .62),	  or	  in	  the	  reported	  length	  of	  time	  that	  had	  passed	  since	  the	  social	  blunder	  occurred	  (t(73)	  =	  .89,	  p	  =	  .38).	  	  Differences	  between	  low	  and	  high	  socially	  anxious	  participants	  were	  examined	  similarly,	  and	  indicated	  higher	  SPIN	  scores	  for	  the	  high	  socially	  anxious	  group	  (t(74)	  =	  -­‐21.49,	  p	  <	  .001),	  as	  expected.	  There	  were	  no	  group	  differences	  in	  the	  distress	  experienced	  during	  the	  occurrence	  of	  the	  social	  blunder	  (t(74)	  =	  -­‐1.67,	  p	  =	  .10),	  nor	  in	  the	  length	  of	  time	  elapsed	  since	  the	  event	  occurred	  (t(73)	  =	  1.28,	  p	  =	  .21).	  Mean	  and	  standard	  deviation	  values	  across	  the	  4	  cells	  are	  presented	  in	  Table	  2.	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Table	  2.	  Mean	  and	  standard	  deviation	  values	  for	  high	  and	  low	  socially	  anxious	  (SA)	  
participants	  across	  experimental	  conditions	  
	   Immersed	  Condition	   Distanced	  Condition	  











Low	  SA	   7.68	  (3.22)	   74.47	  (8.48)	   321.79	  (651.90)	   7.55	  (7.01)	   66.40	  (9.33)	   147.79	  (180.98)	  
High	  SA	   36.47	  (6.85)	   71.00	  (8.85)	   108.00	  (113.83)	   36.90	  (6.08)	   76.90	  (11.17)	   145.4	  (199.77)	  Note:	  Standard	  deviations	  in	  parentheses.	  	  
Manipulation	  checks	  The	  effect	  of	  the	  experimental	  manipulation	  comparing	  conditions	  collapsed	  across	  participants	  was	  examined	  by	  way	  of	  two	  independent-­‐samples	  t-­‐tests,	  first	  with	  the	  FFMQ	  non-­‐reactivity	  subscale	  and	  then	  with	  VP	  as	  the	  outcome	  variable.	  If	  the	  manipulation	  worked	  as	  expected,	  participants	  assigned	  to	  the	  distanced	  condition	  should	  have	  reported	  higher	  scores	  (i.e.,	  greater	  non-­‐reactivity	  to	  inner	  experiences)	  on	  the	  FFMQ	  as	  well	  as	  greater	  third-­‐person	  (“fly	  on	  the	  wall”)	  than	  first-­‐person	  (“own	  eyes”)	  perspective-­‐taking	  relative	  to	  those	  in	  the	  immersed	  condition.	  The	  t-­‐tests	  were	  repeated	  separately	  for	  each	  of	  the	  experimental	  tasks	  (past	  blunder	  and	  upcoming	  interaction).	  Contrary	  to	  expectations,	  participants	  across	  the	  two	  conditions	  did	  not	  differ	  in	  their	  non-­‐reactivity	  ratings	  on	  the	  FFMQ	  during	  either	  of	  the	  tasks	  (t(73)	  =	  1.1,	  p	  =	  .26,	  and	  t(73)	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=1.0,	  p	  =	  .31,	  respectively).	  However,	  participants	  did	  report	  greater	  first-­‐person	  perspective	  taking	  in	  the	  immersed	  condition	  and	  greater	  third-­‐person	  perspective-­‐taking	  in	  the	  distanced	  condition,	  across	  both	  tasks	  (t(68)	  =	  -­‐2.01,	  p	  =.	  048,	  and	  t(64)=	  -­‐4.5,	  
p	  <	  .001,	  respectively),	  as	  expected.	  Means	  and	  standard	  deviations	  across	  the	  two	  conditions	  are	  provided	  in	  Table	  3.	  	  Table	  3	  
Examination	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  experimental	  manipulation	  on	  FFMQ	  nonreactivity	  and	  
visual	  point	  of	  view	  reported	  by	  participants	  across	  the	  two	  conditions	  	   Social	  blunder	  self-­‐reflection	  
task	  
Social	  anticipation	  self-­‐reflection	  
task	  
Variable	   Self-­‐distancinga	   Point	  of	  viewb	   Self-­‐distancinga	   Point	  of	  viewb	  
Immersed	  
Condition	   21.31	  (6.25)	   -­‐0.74	  (1.64)*	   23.75	  (6.21)	   -­‐1.00	  (1.67)***	  
Distanced	  
Condition	   19.87	  (4.57)	   0.00(1.41)	   22.39	  (5.31)	   0.72	  (1.40)	  
aHigher	  values	  are	  indicative	  of	  greater	  nonreactivity	  to	  inner	  experiences	  (as	  measured	  by	  the	  FFMQ);	  bNegative	  values	  indicate	  a	  first-­‐person	  perspective,	  whereas	  positive	  values	  denote	  a	  third-­‐person	  perspective;	  *p<.05;	  ***p<.005.	  	  
Primary	  analyses	  Separate	  2	  (between-­‐subjects	  factor:	  SA	  group)	  x	  2	  (between-­‐subjects	  factor:	  distanced	  vs.	  immersed	  condition)	  x	  4	  (within-­‐subjects	  factor:	  time)	  mixed-­‐model	  (i.e.,	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repeated	  measures)	  ANOVAs	  were	  conducted	  on	  PANAS	  positive	  affect,	  negative	  affect,	  and	  SUDS	  ratings.	  A	  similar	  2	  x	  2	  x	  2	  mixed-­‐model	  ANOVA	  was	  also	  conducted	  to	  examine	  the	  effects	  of	  SA	  group	  and	  condition	  on	  NSPS	  ratings	  at	  the	  two	  time	  points	  at	  which	  they	  were	  reported.	  	  Results	  for	  positive	  affect	  (with	  the	  Greenhouse-­‐Geisser	  correction	  applied	  for	  violation	  of	  the	  sphericity	  assumption)	  revealed	  only	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  time	  (F(2.63)	  =	  25.74,	  p	  <	  .001),	  indicating	  that	  PA	  values	  collapsed	  across	  groups	  and	  conditions	  fluctuated	  significantly	  over	  time.	  	  Results	  for	  negative	  affect	  (with	  the	  Greenhouse-­‐Geisser	  correction)	  also	  revealed	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  time	  (F(2.59)	  =	  29.10,	  p	  <	  .001).	  In	  addition,	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  between-­‐subjects	  effect	  of	  SA	  group	  (F(1)	  =	  18.47,	  p	  <	  .001),	  with	  high	  SA	  participants	  reporting	  greater	  NA	  overall	  (M=18.85	  vs.	  13.78),	  and	  this	  was	  further	  modified	  by	  a	  significant	  group	  x	  time	  interaction	  effect	  (F(2.59)	  =	  4.86,	  p	  =	  .001).	  Following	  up	  this	  interaction	  with	  independent-­‐samples	  t-­‐tests	  across	  each	  time	  point	  revealed	  higher	  levels	  of	  NA	  in	  the	  high	  SA	  group	  at	  all	  time	  points	  (all	  ts<-­‐3.5,	  all	  ps	  <	  .001)	  other	  than	  immediately	  following	  the	  3-­‐minute	  rest	  period	  (t(73)	  =	  -­‐1.92,	  p	  =	  .061).	  Results	  for	  SUDS	  ratings	  (with	  the	  Greenhouse-­‐Geisser	  correction)	  also	  revealed	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  time	  (F(2.415)	  =	  21.53,	  p	  <	  .001),	  with	  both	  quadratic	  and	  cubic	  functions	  significant	  at	  p	  <	  .005.	  In	  addition,	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  between-­‐subjects	  effect	  of	  SA	  group	  (F(1)	  =	  18.47,	  p	  <	  .001),	  with	  high	  SA	  participants	  reporting	  greater	  SUDS	  ratings	  overall	  (M	  =	  42.46	  vs.	  29.69).	  Results	  for	  NSPS	  ratings	  (with	  the	  Greenhouse-­‐Geisser	  correction)	  also	  revealed	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  time	  (F(1)	  =	  13.10,	  p	  <	  .001),	  as	  well	  as	  a	  between-­‐subjects	  effect	  
	   25	  
of	  SA	  group	  (F(1)	  =	  28.27,	  p	  <	  .001),	  with	  high	  SA	  participants	  reporting	  greater	  self-­‐portrayal	  concerns	  following	  both	  blunder	  and	  social	  anticipation	  self	  reflection	  tasks	  (M(SD)	  =	  67.5	  (16.5)	  and	  M(SD)	  =	  61.1	  (21.6)	  in	  the	  high	  SA	  group,	  respectively,	  and	  M(SD)	  =	  49.0	  (16.4)	  and	  M(SD)	  =	  40.7	  (16.5)	  in	  the	  low	  SA	  group,	  respectively).	  In	  summary,	  results	  across	  analyses	  revealed	  that	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  main	  or	  interactive	  effects	  of	  condition	  for	  any	  of	  the	  dependent	  variables	  examined	  (all	  Fs	  <	  1.30,	  all	  ps	  >	  .26,	  all	  partial	  eta	  squared	  values	  <	  .02),	  thus	  failing	  to	  support	  our	  primary	  hypotheses	  for	  the	  affective	  and	  cognitive	  measures.	  Results	  also	  revealed	  no	  significant	  main	  or	  interactive	  effects	  of	  condition	  for	  any	  of	  the	  behavioural	  measures	  following	  the	  anticipation	  self-­‐reflection	  task	  (all	  Fs	  <	  3.21,	  all	  ps	  >	  .08,	  all	  partial	  eta	  squared	  values	  <	  .04),	  thus	  failing	  to	  support	  our	  primary	  hypothesis	  for	  the	  behavioural	  measures.	  
Secondary	  analyses	  To	  further	  explore	  the	  relation	  between	  SA	  and	  self-­‐distancing,	  and	  how	  these	  variables	  might	  interact	  to	  affect	  relevant	  outcomes	  during	  social	  situations,	  secondary	  analyses	  were	  conducted.	  Specifically,	  hierarchical	  linear	  regression	  was	  used	  to	  examine	  the	  relation	  between	  SA	  group	  membership,	  FFMQ	  self-­‐distancing	  scores,	  and	  cognitive,	  affective,	  and	  behavioural	  outcomes	  for	  all	  participants	  collapsed	  across	  experimental	  conditions.	  Various	  outcome	  variables	  were	  examined	  in	  separate	  analyses.	  For	  each	  analysis,	  predictor	  variables	  included	  centered	  scores	  on	  the	  nonreactivity	  subscale	  of	  the	  FFMQ	  and	  dummy-­‐coded	  SA	  group	  membership	  (using	  the	  cutoff	  scores	  on	  the	  SPIN,	  as	  described	  above),	  which	  were	  entered	  in	  step	  1,	  and	  the	  interaction	  term	  of	  these	  two	  predictors,	  which	  was	  entered	  in	  step	  2.	  Analyses	  were	  conducted	  separately	  for	  each	  the	  two	  self-­‐reflection	  tasks	  (recollected	  past	  blunder	  and	  anticipated	  upcoming	  interaction).	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   Results	  revealed	  several	  significant	  main	  effects	  in	  step	  1.	  Specifically,	  greater	  self-­‐immersion	  and	  high	  SA	  status	  each	  significantly	  predicted	  unique	  variance	  in	  PANAS	  negative	  affect	  (with	  β	  =	  .357,	  p	  =	  .001	  for	  SA	  status,	  and	  β	  =	  -­‐.323,	  p	  <	  .001	  for	  self-­‐immersion),	  and	  SUDS	  subjective	  distress	  (with	  β	  =	  .271,	  p	  =	  .016	  for	  SA	  status,	  and	  β	  =	  -­‐.285,	  p=.012	  for	  self	  immersion)	  for	  the	  social	  blunder	  self	  reflection	  task.	  These	  variables	  explained	  25.7%	  of	  the	  overall	  variance	  in	  negative	  affect	  and	  16.2%	  of	  the	  variance	  in	  subjective	  distress.	  Similarly,	  for	  the	  social	  anticipation	  self-­‐reflection	  tasks,	  there	  were	  main	  affects	  of	  negative	  affect	  (with	  β	  =	  .427,	  p	  <	  .001	  for	  SA	  status,	  and	  β	  =	  -­‐.364,	  p	  <	  .001	  for	  self-­‐immersion)	  and	  subjective	  distress	  (with	  β	  =	  .253,	  p	  =	  034	  for	  SA	  status,	  and	  β=	  -­‐.259,	  p	  =	  .030	  for	  self-­‐immersion),	  with	  these	  variables	  explaining	  40.2%	  of	  the	  overall	  variance	  in	  negative	  affect	  and	  15.2%	  of	  the	  variance	  in	  subjective	  distress,	  respectively.	  Self-­‐immersion	  and	  SA	  status	  each	  also	  predicted	  unique	  variance	  in	  NSPS	  self-­‐portrayal	  concerns	  (β	  =	  .427,	  p	  <	  .001	  for	  SA	  status,	  and	  β	  =	  -­‐.364,	  p	  <	  .001	  for	  self	  immersion	  variables),	  explaining	  31%	  of	  the	  variance	  in	  self	  portrayal	  concerns,	  but	  only	  during	  the	  social	  anticipation	  task.	  SA	  status	  but	  not	  self-­‐immersion	  predicted	  unique	  variance	  in	  self-­‐portrayal	  concerns	  during	  the	  social	  blunder	  self-­‐reflection	  task	  (β	  =	  .47,	  
p	  	  <	  .001	  vs.	  β	  =	  -­‐.13,	  p	  =	  .22,	  respectively).	  Greater	  self-­‐immersion	  but	  not	  SA	  status	  predicted	  lower	  positive	  affect	  across	  both	  the	  social	  blunder	  (β	  =	  .31,	  p	  =	  .01	  vs.	  β	  =	  -­‐.07,	  p	  =	  .53,	  respectively),	  and	  anticipation	  (β	  =.	  26,	  p	  =	  .03	  vs.	  β	  =	  -­‐.12,	  p	  =	  .33,	  respectively)	  self-­‐reflection	  tasks.	  	  Finally,	  during	  the	  social	  anticipation	  task,	  self-­‐immersion	  but	  not	  SA	  status	  was	  a	  significant	  predictor	  of	  how	  much	  participants	  looked	  forward	  to	  completing	  the	  social	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interaction	  task	  (β	  =	  .84,	  p	  <	  .001	  vs.	  β	  =	  .005,	  p	  =	  .94,	  respectively).	  Self-­‐immersion	  and	  SA	  status	  (marginally)	  predicted	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  were	  willing	  to	  go	  through	  with	  this	  part	  of	  the	  experiment	  (β	  =.	  243,	  p	  =.	  042	  and	  β	  =	  -­‐.22,	  p	  =	  .074,	  respectively).	  	  In	  step	  2,	  self-­‐immersion	  and	  SA	  group	  membership	  interacted	  significantly	  to	  predict	  negative	  affect	  in	  anticipation	  of	  the	  social	  interaction	  task	  (R2	  of	  overall	  model	  =.461,	  p=.023),	  but	  all	  other	  interactions	  were	  nonsignificant.	  The	  interaction	  term	  explained	  an	  additional	  4.2%	  of	  the	  variance	  in	  this	  model	  over	  and	  above	  that	  explained	  by	  step	  1	  alone	  (p	  =	  .023).	  	  Simple	  slope	  analyses	  were	  conducted	  in	  order	  to	  examine	  the	  slope	  of	  the	  regression	  line	  associating	  negative	  affect	  and	  self-­‐distancing	  within	  the	  high	  and	  low	  socially	  anxious	  groups	  at	  1SD	  above	  and	  below	  the	  mean	  distancing	  score	  (as	  measured	  by	  the	  FFMQ).	  For	  low	  socially	  anxious	  participants,	  the	  slope	  of	  the	  regression	  line	  did	  not	  differ	  from	  zero	  (p	  =	  .25),	  suggesting	  that	  negative	  affect	  did	  not	  vary	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  self-­‐distancing	  for	  low	  anxious	  participants.	  Conversely,	  in	  high	  socially	  anxious	  participants,	  the	  regression	  line	  had	  a	  negative	  slope	  that	  was	  significantly	  different	  from	  0	  (p	  <	  .001),	  suggesting	  that	  as	  self-­‐distancing	  increased,	  negative	  affect	  decreased.	  This	  interaction	  is	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  2.	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Figure	  2	  
The	  association	  between	  self-­‐distancing	  and	  negative	  affect	  immediately	  following	  the	  social	  
anticipation	  self	  reflection	  amongst	  high	  and	  low	  socially	  anxious	  participants.	  Greater	  self-­‐
distancing	  is	  equivalent	  to	  lower	  self-­‐immersion.	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reflections.	  Participants	  who	  received	  distancing	  instructions	  tended	  to	  report	  a	  third-­‐person	  perspective,	  while	  those	  who	  received	  immersing	  instructions	  reported	  a	  first-­‐person	  perspective.	  These	  differences	  suggest	  that	  participants	  were	  attending	  to	  the	  instructions	  while	  completing	  their	  self-­‐reflections	  because	  the	  instructions	  explicitly	  asked	  participants	  to	  adopt	  a	  third-­‐person	  (“fly	  on	  the	  wall”)	  or	  first-­‐person	  (“own	  eyes”)	  perspective,	  respectively,	  between	  the	  two	  conditions.	  Despite	  attending	  to	  the	  instructions,	  it	  is	  possible	  –	  given	  the	  nonsignificant	  FFMQ	  differences	  across	  conditions	  –	  that	  the	  self-­‐distancing	  instructions	  were	  not	  internalized	  and	  utilized	  as	  predicted,	  which	  may	  have	  been	  one	  reason	  that	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  main	  or	  interactive	  effects	  of	  
experimental	  condition	  in	  our	  primary	  analyses.	  Although	  our	  experimental	  manipulation	  may	  not	  have	  worked	  to	  produce	  its	  intended	  effects	  on	  self-­‐distancing,	  individual	  differences	  in	  self-­‐distancing	  across	  participants	  in	  the	  study	  allowed	  for	  secondary	  analyses	  examining	  the	  relationship	  between	  distancing/immersion	  as	  a	  continuous	  variable,	  SA	  status,	  and	  self-­‐appraisals,	  affect,	  and	  behaviour.	  In	  line	  with	  our	  hypothesis,	  greater	  self-­‐immersion	  predicted	  higher	  levels	  of	  negative	  affect	  and	  subjective	  distress	  and	  lower	  levels	  of	  positive	  affect	  across	  both	  self-­‐reflection	  tasks.	  These	  associations	  remained	  significant	  even	  after	  accounting	  for	  SA	  symptom	  severity,	  suggesting	  that	  psychological	  distancing	  helps	  to	  reduce	  negative	  affect	  and	  negative	  self-­‐appraisals	  over	  and	  above	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  individuals	  endorse	  SA	  symptoms	  (such	  symptoms,	  we	  found,	  are	  also	  –	  as	  expected	  –	  independently	  related	  to	  these	  negative	  outcomes	  over	  and	  above	  the	  effects	  of	  self-­‐distancing).	  	  Participants	  in	  the	  present	  study	  reported	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  they	  looked	  forward	  to	  and	  were	  willing	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  social	  interaction	  task.	  As	  such,	  this	  measure	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represents	  a	  face-­‐valid	  measure	  of	  participants’	  intended	  behaviour.	  Results	  indicated	  that	  the	  more	  self-­‐immersed	  participants	  were,	  the	  less	  likely	  they	  were	  to	  endorse	  looking	  forward	  to	  the	  social	  task.	  Even	  after	  accounting	  for	  SA	  symptoms,	  self-­‐immersed	  participants	  reported	  less	  willingness	  to	  go	  through	  with	  the	  social	  task.	  This	  outcome	  suggests	  that	  over	  and	  above	  SA	  symptom	  severity,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  individuals	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  approach	  a	  social	  situation	  is	  affected	  by	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  are	  psychologically	  distanced.	  Thus,	  even	  amongst	  highly	  anxious	  individuals,	  a	  psychologically	  distanced	  perspective	  may	  be	  associated	  with	  more	  positive	  outcomes,	  both	  during	  post-­‐event	  self-­‐reflection	  and	  anticipatory	  processing	  of	  a	  socially	  threatening	  situation.	  	  Regression	  analyses	  also	  demonstrated	  a	  significant	  interaction	  between	  self-­‐distancing	  and	  SA	  status	  in	  predicting	  the	  experience	  of	  negative	  affect.	  Among	  high	  SA	  participants,	  negative	  affect	  increased	  linearly	  with	  increases	  in	  psychological	  immersion,	  while	  among	  the	  low	  SA	  participants,	  such	  a	  relation	  was	  not	  found,	  with	  low	  SA	  participants	  reporting	  equivalent	  levels	  of	  negative	  affect	  across	  levels	  of	  immersion/distancing.	  Thus,	  in	  high	  SA	  participants,	  negative	  affect	  appears	  to	  be	  related	  to	  self-­‐distancing,	  while	  in	  low	  SA	  participants,	  it	  does	  not.	  Consequently,	  high	  SA	  individuals	  may	  benefit	  from	  adopting	  a	  psychologically	  distanced	  perspective	  in	  threat-­‐relevant	  situations	  (i.e.,	  self-­‐reflection	  over	  past	  negative	  events	  and	  upcoming	  social	  interaction	  tasks),	  while	  low	  SA	  individuals	  may	  not.	  Thus,	  the	  benefits	  of	  adopting	  a	  distanced	  perspective	  during	  self-­‐reflection	  may	  be	  most	  beneficial	  to	  individuals	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  SA.	  However,	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  analysis	  reveals	  associations	  between	  these	  variables,	  and	  does	  not	  reveal	  whether	  one	  variable	  influences	  the	  other,	  or	  whether	  both	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variables	  are	  simultaneously	  influenced	  by	  a	  third,	  unidentified	  variable.	  As	  such,	  causal	  conclusions	  cannot	  be	  inferred	  via	  this	  particular	  analysis.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  our	  results	  might	  generalize	  to	  a	  clinical	  sample	  of	  individuals	  with	  SAD	  vs.	  healthy	  controls,	  the	  variability	  in	  spontaneous	  self-­‐distancing	  across	  our	  analogue	  sample	  of	  high	  and	  low	  SA	  participants	  suggests	  that	  even	  clinical	  samples	  might	  vary	  in	  their	  inherent	  abilities	  to	  be	  self-­‐distanced	  or	  immersed.	  These	  differences	  are	  important,	  as	  our	  data	  support	  the	  view	  that	  within	  the	  context	  of	  self-­‐reflection	  on	  social	  threat,	  psychological	  distancing	  is	  associated	  with	  more	  positive	  outcomes	  and	  psychological	  immersion	  with	  greater	  negative	  outcomes,	  over	  and	  above	  the	  contribution	  of	  SA	  symptoms	  alone.	  It	  cannot	  be	  determined	  from	  this	  study	  whether	  individuals	  who	  naturally	  distance	  themselves	  are	  protected	  against	  becoming	  immersed,	  or	  whether	  those	  who	  are	  naturally	  immersed	  will	  experience	  difficulty	  in	  becoming	  distanced.	  Future	  studies	  should	  investigate	  this	  relationship	  in	  clinical	  populations	  to	  determine	  if	  self-­‐distancing	  may	  act	  as	  a	  protective	  factor	  in	  SAD,	  which	  may	  serve	  as	  a	  foundation	  that	  promotes	  and	  enhances	  individuals’	  ability	  to	  acquire	  and	  use	  adaptive	  ER	  skills	  during	  anxiety-­‐provoking	  social	  situations.	  A	  troubling	  limitation	  of	  the	  present	  study	  pertained	  to	  the	  results	  of	  the	  primary	  manipulation	  check,	  which	  suggested	  that	  the	  self-­‐distancing	  manipulation	  may	  not	  have	  worked	  as	  intended.	  A	  possible	  confound	  may	  have	  been	  the	  cultural	  composition	  of	  our	  study	  sample,	  with	  almost	  half	  of	  our	  participants	  identifying	  as	  Chinese.	  Indeed,	  concepts	  and	  construals	  of	  self	  and	  their	  associated	  emotional	  and	  behavioural	  sequelae	  tend	  to	  differ	  significantly	  across	  cultures	  (e.g.,	  Markus	  &	  Kitamaya,	  1991).	  Such	  differences	  may	  also	  extend	  to	  self-­‐distancing	  and	  related	  metacognitive	  processes.	  For	  example,	  in	  one	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recent	  study	  examining	  spontaneous	  self-­‐distancing	  across	  a	  three-­‐week	  period	  in	  Russians	  and	  Americans,	  it	  was	  found	  that	  Russians	  tended	  to	  be	  more	  self-­‐distanced	  than	  Americans,	  which	  lead	  them	  to	  experience	  significantly	  less	  distress	  when	  reflecting	  upon	  negative	  experiences	  (Grossmann	  &	  Kross,	  2010).	  	  Thus,	  it	  is	  quite	  possible	  that	  the	  cultural	  makeup	  of	  our	  sample	  inadvertently	  undermined	  our	  manipulation	  by	  introducing	  significant	  culture-­‐related	  variance	  across	  participants’	  responses	  on	  our	  primary	  measures,	  which	  we	  did	  not	  anticipate	  or	  hypothesize	  from	  the	  outset.	  	  Whereas	  our	  study	  investigated	  how	  visual	  perspective	  might	  influence	  self-­‐appraisals	  and	  related	  outcomes	  in	  social	  anxiety,	  others	  have	  investigated	  how	  temporal	  
perspectives	  might	  moderate	  self-­‐appraisals	  generated	  under	  certain	  visual	  perspectives.	  For	  example,	  Libby,	  Eibach	  and	  Gilovich	  (2005)	  examined	  undergraduate	  students’	  own	  perceptions	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  had	  become	  more	  socially	  competent	  and	  less	  socially	  awkward	  since	  high	  school.	  It	  emerged	  that	  participants	  who	  adopted	  a	  third-­‐person	  perspective	  (i.e.,	  a	  psychologically	  distanced	  perspective)	  judged	  themselves	  as	  having	  become	  more	  socially	  skilled	  since	  high	  school	  in	  comparison	  to	  those	  who	  adopted	  a	  first-­‐person	  perspective.	  Furthermore,	  participants	  who	  reported	  greater	  self-­‐change	  also	  behaved	  more	  socially	  with	  a	  confederate	  than	  participants	  who	  reported	  less	  change	  since	  high	  school.	  However,	  this	  effect	  was	  also	  moderated,	  such	  that	  participants	  adopting	  a	  third-­‐person	  perspective	  judged	  themselves	  as	  becoming	  more	  socially	  skilled	  over	  time	  specifically	  when	  they	  looked	  for	  evidence	  of	  change,	  in	  comparison	  to	  participants	  who	  sought	  evidence	  of	  continuity,	  for	  whom	  self-­‐judgments	  of	  social	  skill	  development	  did	  not	  change	  as	  much.	  Related	  to	  this,	  a	  recent	  study	  investigating	  psychological	  distancing	  by	  Kross	  and	  colleagues	  showed	  that	  reductions	  in	  cigarette	  cravings	  could	  be	  induced	  by	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instructing	  smokers	  to	  focus	  on	  long-­‐term	  (as	  opposed	  to	  short-­‐term)	  consequences	  of	  smoking,	  suggesting	  that	  manipulating	  temporal	  construals	  may	  produce	  the	  types	  of	  cognitive	  and	  behavioural	  effects	  that	  are	  hypothesized	  to	  be	  related	  to	  greater	  self-­‐distancing	  (Kober,	  Kross,	  Mischel,	  Hart	  &	  Ochsner,	  2010).	  Thus,	  it	  would	  be	  of	  interest	  to	  replicate	  and	  extend	  our	  own	  findings	  in	  future	  studies	  with	  experimental	  manipulations	  that	  focus	  on	  temporal	  self-­‐distancing	  rather	  than	  distancing	  via	  visual	  perspectives	  per	  se.	  Indeed,	  there	  is	  already	  some	  indirect	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  temporal	  distancing	  could	  be	  helpful	  for	  socially	  anxious	  individuals	  attempting	  to	  reappraise	  their	  negative	  perceptions	  of	  past	  autobiographical	  events.	  For	  example,	  efficacious	  imagery	  and	  memory	  rescripting	  interventions	  for	  social	  anxiety	  disorder	  are	  thought	  to	  achieve	  their	  powerful	  effects	  by	  helping	  to	  guide	  socially	  anxious	  patients	  to	  view	  their	  negative	  childhood	  memories	  through	  the	  eyes	  of	  a	  wiser	  and	  more	  compassionate	  “adult	  self,”	  thereby	  updating	  their	  appraised	  meanings	  (Nilsson,	  Lundh,	  &	  Viborg,	  2012).	  	  	  According	  to	  construal-­‐level	  theory	  (Trope	  &	  Liberman,	  2010)	  there	  are	  many	  levels	  of	  construals	  that	  can	  be	  manipulated	  in	  order	  to	  elicit	  psychological	  distance,	  including	  manipulating	  social	  distance	  (e.g.	  social	  power	  or	  ownership),	  hypotheticality	  (e.g.,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  anticipation),	  novelty	  of	  experiences,	  and	  generalization	  from	  past	  experiences.	  In	  each	  case,	  the	  key	  to	  achieving	  greater	  psychological	  distance	  is	  departing	  from	  the	  “here	  and	  now,”	  a	  low-­‐level	  construal	  which	  is	  concerned	  with	  immediate	  purposes	  (such	  as	  evading	  negative	  social	  evaluation	  in	  the	  case	  of	  SA),	  to	  higher-­‐level	  construals	  that	  allow	  individual	  to	  transcend	  present-­‐oriented	  mental	  constructions	  in	  order	  to	  imagine	  hypothetical	  “realities.”	  Thus,	  future	  studies	  should	  investigate	  the	  effects	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of	  varied	  forms	  of	  immersion	  and	  distancing	  on	  self-­‐appraisals,	  emotion,	  and	  behaviour	  in	  socially	  anxious	  individuals.	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Appendix	  A	  	  SPIN	  	  Please	  choose	  a	  number	  to	  indicate	  how	  much	  the	  following	  problems	  tend	  to	  bother	  you	  
in	  a	  typical	  week.	  Choose	  only	  one	  number	  for	  each	  problem,	  and	  be	  sure	  to	  answer	  all	  items.	  	   0	  =	  Not	  at	  all	  1	  =	  A	  little	  bit	  2	  =	  Somewhat	  3	  =	  Very	  much	  4	  =	  Extremely	  	  1. I	  am	  afraid	  of	  people	  in	  authority.	   	  	  	  	   	   0	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2.	  	   I	  am	  bothered	  by	  blushing	  in	  front	  of	  	   	  people.	  	   	   0	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  3.	  	   Parties	  and	  social	  events	  scare	  me.	  	   	   0	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  4.	  	   I	  avoid	  talking	  to	  people	  I	  don’t	  know.	  	   	   0	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  5.	  	   Being	  criticized	  scares	  me	  a	  lot.	  	   	   0	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  6.	  	   Fear	  of	  embarrassment	  causes	  me	  	  	   to	  avoid	  doing	  things	  or	  speaking	  	  	   to	  people.	  	   	   0	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  7.	  	   Sweating	  in	  front	  of	  people	  causes	  	  	   me	  distress.	  	   	   0	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  8.	  	   I	  avoid	  going	  to	  parties.	   	  	   	   0	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  9.	  	   I	  avoid	  activities	  in	  which	  I	  am	  the	  center	  	  	   of	  attention.	   	  	   	   0	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	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10.	  	   Talking	  to	  strangers	  scares	  me.	   	  	   	   0	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  11.	   I	  avoid	  having	  to	  give	  speeches.	   	  	   	   0	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  12.	   I	  would	  do	  anything	  to	  avoid	  being	  	   	  criticized.	  	   	   0	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  13.	   Heart	  palpitations	  bother	  me	  when	  	  	   I	  am	  around	  people.	   	  	   	   0	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  14.	   I	  am	  afraid	  of	  doing	  things	  when	  people	  	   	  might	  be	  watching.	  	   	   0	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  15.	   Being	  embarrassed	  or	  looking	  stupid	  	  	   are	  among	  my	  worst	  fears.	   	  	   	   0	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  16.	   I	  avoid	  speaking	  to	  anyone	  in	  authority.	   	   	  	   	   0	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	  	  17.	  	   Trembling	  or	  shaking	  in	  front	  of	  others	  	  	   is	  distressing	  to	  me.	  	   	   0	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  	  	  	  3	  	  	  	  	  4	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Appendix	  B	  PANAS	  	  This	  scale	  consists	  of	  a	  number	  of	  words	  that	  describe	  different	  feelings	  and	  emotions.	  Read	  each	  item	  and	  then	  insert	  the	  appropriate	  answer	  (number)	  in	  the	  space	  next	  to	  that	  word.	  Indicate	  how	  you	  are	  feeling	  right	  now.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	   	   	   	  	  	  	  3	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	   5	  
very	  slightly	  or	   a	  little	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  moderately	   	   quite	  a	  bit	   	  	  	  	  	  
extremely	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Appendix	  C	  
	  SUDS	  	  Please	  indicate	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  0	  to	  100	  how	  anxious	  you	  feel	  right	  now,	  with	  0	  representing	  no	  anxiety	  and	  100	  representing	  the	  highest	  possible	  level	  of	  anxiety.	  Record	  your	  answer	  in	  the	  space	  provided	  below.	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Appendix	  D	  	  NSPS	  	  According	  to	  the	  scale	  provided	  below,	  please	  write	  the	  number	  in	  the	  blank	  space	  beside	  each	  item	  to	  indicate	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  you	  were	  focused	  on	  feeling	  concerned	  about	  the	  following	  aspects	  of	  yourself	  when	  recalling	  your	  anxiety-­‐provoking	  social	  situation.	  Rate	  how	  concerned	  you	  felt	  today	  about	  each	  item	  while	  recalling	  the	  social	  experience	  you	  had	  in	  the	  past.	  	  	  	  	   1	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  2	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  3	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  4	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Not	  at	  all	   	   Slightly	   	  	  	  Moderately	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Very	   	   	  	  Extremely	  	  	  	  	  	  concerned	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  concerned	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  concerned	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  concerned	   	  	  concerned	  	  
While	  recalling	  the	  anxiety-­‐provoking	  social	  situation	  today,	  I	  felt	  concerned	  that	  the	  
other	  person	  (or	  people)	  who	  were	  present	  in	  my	  memory	  noticed	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  
event	  that	  I	  was:	  	  _____	  1.	  	  stuttering	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  _____	  2.	  	  poorly	  dressed	   	   	   	   	   	  _____	  3.	  	  boring	   	   	   	   	   	  _____	  4.	  	  sweating	   	   	   	   	   	  _____	  5.	  	  physically	  unattractive	   	   	   	  _____	  6.	  	  losing	  control	  of	  my	  emotions	  	   	   	  	  _____	  7.	  	  blushing	   	   	   	   	   	  _____	  8.	  	  speaking	  with	  a	  trembling	  voice	   	  	  	   	  _____	  9.	  	  blemished	  (i.e.,	  my	  appearance)	   	   	  _____	  10.	  	  interpersonally	  ineffective	   	   	  _____	  11.	  	  weird-­‐looking	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	  _____	  12.	  	  lacking	  personality	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  _____	  13.	  	  fat	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  _____	  14.	  	  unable	  to	  express	  myself	   	   	   	  _____	  15.	  	  twitching	  (i.e.	  my	  facial	  muscles)	  	   	   	  _____	  16.	  	  frozen	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  _____	  17.	  	  humourless	  	   	   	   	  _____	  18.	  	  reserved	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_____	  19.	  	  aloof	  	   	   	   	   	  _____	  20.	  	  stupid	   	   	   	   	   	  _____	  21.	  	  socially	  awkward	   	   	   	   	  _____	  22.	  	  having	  a	  bad	  hair	  day	   	   	   	   	  _____	  23.	  	  speaking	  incoherently	   	   	   	  _____	  24.	  	  lacking	  social	  skills	  	  _____	  25.	  	  fidgeting	   	  _____	  26.	  	  unfashionable	   	  _____	  27.	  	  ugly	  	  	   	  




Please rate each of the following statements using the scale provided. Choose the number that 
best describes your own opinion of what was currently true for you during the self-reflection 
task you just completed. 
 
           1       2         3       4   5  
Never or very  Rarely  Sometimes  Often  Very often or   
   rarely true    true      true    true    always true 
 
 
I perceived my feelings and emotions without having to react to them.  
 
I watched my feelings without getting lost in them.  
 
In thinking about these difficult situations, I was able to pause without immediately reacting.  
 
When I was having distressing thoughts or images, I was able just to notice them without 
reacting. 
 
When I had distressing thoughts or images, I felt calm soon after.  
 
When I had distressing thoughts or images, I was able to “step back” and become aware of the 
thought or image without getting taken over by it. 
 
When I had distressing thoughts or images, I was able to just notice them and let them go. 
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Appendix	  F	  
Visual Perspective Rating 
 
Using this scale, please provide a rating of your perspective during the self-reflection exercise.             
  -3                    -2                    -1                    0                    +1                    +2                   +3 
entirely looking                                                                                                    entirely observing   
out through my eyes                                                                                                 myself from an  
                                                                                                                       external point of view 
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Appendix	  G	  
Instructions	  for	  recalling	  a	  past	  social	  blunder	  from	  the	  immersed	  perspective	  
	  
	   In	  a	  moment,	  I	  will	  ask	  you,	  while	  viewing	  your	  reflection	  in	  the	  mirror,	  to	  spend	  a	  couple	  minutes	  going	  back	  in	  your	  mind	  to	  the	  time	  and	  place	  of	  the	  negative	  social	  experience	  you	  told	  me	  about.	  Try	  to	  imagine	  yourself	  in	  the	  situation	  again,	  reliving	  the	  situation	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  your	  past	  self,	  observing	  the	  event	  as	  it	  unfolds.	  So,	  try	  to	  watch	  the	  event	  occur	  as	  if	  it	  were	  happening	  to	  you	  all	  over	  again.	   	  After	  you	  imagine	  the	  experience,	  spend	  a	  few	  minutes	  writing	  about	  what	  happened	  during	  that	  event,	  as	  you	  imagine	  yourself	  in	  the	  situation	  again.	  Try	  to	  view	  your	  past	  self	  and	  the	  situation	  you	  encountered	  as	  if	  event	  as	  happening	  to	  you	  all	  over	  again.	   	  Finally,	  I	  will	  ask	  you	  to	  spend	  a	  few	  more	  minutes	  writing	  and	  analyzing	  your	  feelings	  about	  the	  event	  in	  order	  to	  try	  to	  understand	  why	  the	  event	  happened	  as	  it	  did,	  and	  why	  you	  may	  have	  felt	  the	  way	  you	  did.	  Please	  remember	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  perspective	  of	  recalling	  the	  memory	  as	  if	  it	  was	  happening	  to	  you	  all	  over	  again.	  
Let	  me	  give	  you	  an	  example	  of	  a	  non-­‐social	  blunder	  from	  my	  own	  life,	  
just	  to	  give	  you	  a	  sense	  of	  what	  I	  mean.	  I	  can	  remember	  walking	  on	  
my	  way	   to	   a	   class	   where	   I	   was	   scheduled	   to	  make	   a	   presentation.	  
Midway	  through	  my	  walk,	  and	  already	  running	  late,	  I	  realized	  that	  I	  
had	  left	  my	  thumb	  drive	  with	  the	  powerpoint	  presentation	  on	  it,	  and	  
the	   handouts	   for	   the	   class	   on	   the	   kitchen	   counter	   back	   at	   home.	   I	  
realized	  that	  there	  was	  no	  way	  for	  me	  to	  get	  the	  materials,	  and	  make	  
it	   to	  class	  on	   time	   for	   the	   start	  of	  presentations,	  My	  anxiety	  was	  at	  
the	   level	   of	   a	   80	   out	   of	   100.	   So,	   if	   I	   were	   doing	   this	   self-­‐reflection	  
exercise	  for	  that	  example,	  I	  go	  back	  in	  my	  mind	  to	  that	  moment	  and	  
then,	   keeping	   that	   scene	   in	  my	  memory	   very	  much	   in	  mind,	   try	   to	  
envision	   my	   past	   self	   within	   that	   scene	   and	   reflect	   on	   what	   I	   (or	  
“Dan”)	  was	  thinking	  about	  and	  feeling,	  what	  “Dan”	  was	  experiencing	  
and	   doing,	   and	   how	   “Dan”	   was	   behaving	   in	   those	   moments	   from	  
“Dan’s”	   perspective	   as	   the	   event	   was	   unfolding.	   Then,	   from	   that	  
perspective,	   I	   would	   try	   to	   analyze	  why	   I/Dan	  was	   feeling	   anxious	  
and	  behaving	   in	   those	  ways,	  and	  what	  may	  have	  been	  going	  on	   for	  
me/Dan	   that	   led	   me	   to	   feel	   and	   behave	   like	   that.	  Of	   course,	   my	  
example	   is	   taken	  from	  a	  time	  when	  I	  was	  alone,	  whereas	  yours	  will	  
be	  a	  negative	  social	  experience.	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Appendix	  H	  
Instructions	  for	  recalling	  a	  past	  social	  blunder	  from	  the	  distanced	  perspective	  
	   In	  a	  moment,	  I	  will	  ask	  you,	  while	  viewing	  your	  reflection	  in	  the	  mirror,	  to	  spend	  a	  couple	  minutes	  going	  back	  in	  your	  mind	  to	  the	  time	  and	  place	  of	  the	  negative	  social	  experience	  you	  told	  me	  about.	  Try	  to	  imagine	  yourself	  in	  the	  situation	  again,	  reliving	  the	  situation	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  your	  past	  self	  as	  if	  you	  are	  a	  “fly	  on	  the	  wall”	  observing	  the	  event	  as	  it	  unfolds.	  So,	  try	  to	  watch	  the	  event	  unfold	  as	  if	  it	  were	  happening	  all	  over	  again,	  but	  to	  the	  distant	  you,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  that	  fly	  on	  the	  wall.	   	  After	  you	  imagine	  the	  experience,	  spend	  a	  few	  minutes	  writing	  about	  what	  happened	  during	  that	  event,	  as	  you	  imagine	  yourself	  in	  the	  situation	  again.	  Try	  to	  view	  your	  past	  self	  and	  the	  situation	  you	  encountered	  as	  if	  you	  are	  a	  “fly	  on	  the	  wall”	  observing	  the	  event	  as	  it	  unfolds.	  So,	  try	  to	  watch	  the	  event	  unfold	  as	  if	  it	  were	  happening	  all	  over	  again,	  but	  to	  the	  distant	  you.	   	  Finally,	  spend	  a	  few	  more	  minutes	  writing	  and	  analyzing	  your	  feelings	  about	  the	  event	  in	  order	  to	  try	  to	  understand	  why	  the	  event	  happened	  as	  it	  did,	  and	  why	  you	  may	  have	  felt	  the	  way	  you	  did.	  Please	  remember	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  “fly	  on	  the	  wall”	  as	  you	  do	  this.	  
Let	  me	  give	  you	  an	  example	  of	  a	  non-­‐social	  blunder	   from	  my	  
own	   life,	   just	   to	   give	   you	   a	   sense	   of	   what	   I	   mean.	   I	   can	  
remember	   walking	   on	   my	   way	   to	   a	   class	   where	   I	   was	  
scheduled	  to	  make	  a	  presentation.	  Midway	  through	  my	  walk,	  
and	  already	  running	  late,	   I	  realized	  that	  I	  had	  left	  my	  thumb	  
drive	   with	   the	   powerpoint	   presentation	   on	   it,	   and	   the	  
handouts	  for	  the	  class	  on	  the	  kitchen	  counter	  back	  at	  home.	  I	  
realized	   that	   there	  was	   no	  way	   for	  me	   to	   get	   the	  materials,	  
and	  make	  it	  to	  class	  on	  time	  for	  the	  start	  of	  presentations,	  My	  
anxiety	  was	  at	  the	  level	  of	  a	  80	  out	  of	  100.	  So,	  if	  I	  were	  doing	  
this	   self-­‐reflection	   exercise	   for	   that	   example,	   I	   go	  back	   in	  my	  
mind	   to	   that	   moment	   and	   then,	   keeping	   that	   scene	   in	   my	  
memory	  very	  much	  in	  mind,	  try	  to	  step	  a	  bit	  away	  from	  myself	  
within	   that	   scene	   and	   reflect	   on	   what	   I	   (or	   “Dan”)	   was	  
thinking	  about	  and	  feeling,	  what	  “Dan”	  was	  experiencing	  and	  
doing,	   and	   how	   “Dan”	  was	   behaving	   in	   those	  moments	   from	  
the	   perspective	   of	   a	  more	   distant	   “fly	   on	   the	  wall”	  who	  may	  
have	  been	  observing	  Dan	  as	  he	  went	  through	  this	  experience.	  
Then,	  from	  that	  perspective,	  I	  would	  try	  to	  analyze	  why	  I/Dan	  
was	   feeling	   anxious	   and	   behaving	   in	   those	   ways,	   and	   what	  
may	  have	  been	  going	  on	   for	  me/Dan	   that	   led	  me	   to	   feel	  and	  
behave	   like	   that.	  Of	   course,	  my	  example	   is	   taken	   from	  a	   time	  
when	   I	   was	   alone,	   whereas	   yours	   will	   be	   a	   negative	   social	  
experience.	  





Instructions	  for	  reflecting	  on	  the	  upcoming	  social	  task	  from	  the	  immersed	  
perspective	  
	   In	  the	  upcoming	  task,	  while	  viewing	  your	  reflection	  in	  the	  mirror,	  try	  to	  imagine	  the	  details	  of	  the	  upcoming	  conversation.	  Imagine	  yourself	  in	  the	  conversation,	  but	  from	  the	  your	  own,	  immersed	  perspective,	  observing	  you	  and	  the	  social	  encounter	  as	  it	  unfolds.	  From	  that	  perspective,	  imagine	  what	  your	  thoughts	  and	  feelings	  will	  be	  like.	  Imagine	  how	  the	  conversation	  will	  go.	  After	  you	  imagine	  what	  the	  experience	  will	  be	  like,	  spend	  a	  few	  minutes	  writing	  about	  what	  will	  happen	  during	  this	  conversation.	  Try	  to	  imagine	  yourself	  in	  the	  conversation,	  but	  from	  your	  own	  perspective,	  observing	  yourself	  and	  the	  social	  encounter	  as	  it	  unfolds.	  From	  that	  perspective,	  imagine	  what	  your	  thoughts	  and	  feelings	  will	  be	  like.	  Imagine	  how	  the	  conversation	  will	  go.	  Spend	  the	  next	  2	  minutes	  writing	  and	  analyzing	  why	  you	  will	  feel	  the	  way	  you	  imagine	  you’ll	  feel	  and	  why	  the	  conversation	  will	  go	  the	  way	  you	  envision	  it	  going.	  Please	  remember	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  immersed	  perspective	  as	  you	  do	  this.	  
	  
Let	  me	  give	  you	  an	  example.	  Let’s	  say	  I	  am	  anticipating	  sitting	  
in	  front	  of	  my	  computer	  and	  writing	  a	  term	  paper.	  So,	  if	  I	  were	  
doing	   this	   self-­‐reflection	   exercise	   for	   that	   example,	   I	   would	  
imagine	  myself	   in	   front	   of	   my	   computer,	   keeping	   that	   scene	  
very	  much	  in	  mind,	  as	  I	  reflect	  on	  what	  I	  (or	  “Dan”)	  would	  be	  
thinking	  about	  and	  feeling,	  what	  “Dan”	  would	  be	  experiencing	  
and	   doing,	   how	   “Dan”	   would	   be	   behaving	   in	   those	  moments	  
from	   “Dan’s”	   perspective	   as	   the	   event	   was	   unfolding.	   Then,	  
from	  that	  perspective,	  I	  would	  try	  to	  analyze	  why	  I/Dan	  would	  
be	   experiencing	   those	   things	   –	   in	   other	   words,	   why	   I/Dan	  
would	  be	  feeling,	  thinking,	  and	  behaving	  like	  that.	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Appendix	  J	  
Instructions	  for	  reflecting	  on	  the	  upcoming	  social	  task	  from	  the	  distanced	  
perspective	  
	   In	  a	  moment,	  while	  viewing	  your	  reflection	  in	  the	  mirror,	  try	  to	  imagine	  the	  details	  of	  the	  upcoming	  conversation.	  Imagine	  yourself	  in	  the	  conversation,	  but	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  “fly	  on	  the	  wall”	  observing	  you	  and	  the	  social	  encounter	  as	  it	  unfolds.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  that	  fly,	  imagine	  what	  your	  thoughts	  and	  feelings	  will	  be	  like.	  Imagine	  how	  the	  conversation	  will	  go.	  After	  you	  imagine	  the	  experience,	  I	  will	  ask	  you	  to	  spend	  a	  few	  minutes	  writing	  about	  what	  will	  happen	  during	  this	  conversation.	  Try	  to	  imagine	  yourself	  in	  the	  conversation,	  but	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  “fly	  on	  the	  wall”	  observing	  you	  and	  the	  social	  encounter	  as	  it	  unfolds.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  that	  fly,	  imagine	  what	  your	  thoughts	  and	  feelings	  will	  be	  like.	  Imagine	  how	  the	  conversation	  will	  go.	  Finally,	  I	  will	  ask	  you	  to	  spend	  a	  few	  more	  minutes	  writing	  and	  analyzing	  
why	  you	  will	  feel	  the	  way	  you	  imagine	  you’ll	  feel	  and	  why	  the	  conversation	  will	  go	  the	  way	  you	  envision	  it	  going.	  Please	  remember	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  “fly	  on	  the	  wall”	  as	  you	  do	  this.	  
	  
Let	  me	  give	  you	  an	  example.	  Let’s	  say	  I	  am	  anticipating	  sitting	  
in	  front	  of	  my	  computer	  and	  writing	  a	  term	  paper.	  So,	  if	  I	  were	  
doing	   this	   self-­‐reflection	   exercise	   for	   that	   example,	   I	   would	  
imagine	  myself	  in	  front	  of	  my	  computer	  and	  then,	  keeping	  that	  
scene	   very	   much	   in	   mind,	   as	   I	   reflect	   on	   what	   I	   (or	   “Dan”)	  
would	   be	   thinking	   about	   and	   feeling,	   what	   “Dan”	   would	   be	  
experiencing	   and	   doing,	   how	   “Dan”	   would	   be	   behaving	   in	  
those	  moments,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  more	  distant	  “fly	  on	  
the	  wall”	  who	  may	  have	  observe	  Dan	  as	  he	  goes	  through	  this	  
experience.	  Then,	  from	  that	  perspective,	  I	  would	  try	  to	  analyze	  
why	   I/Dan	   would	   be	   experiencing	   those	   things	   –	   in	   other	  
words,	   why	   I/Dan	   would	   be	   feeling,	   thinking,	   and	   behaving	  
like	  that.	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Appendix	  K	  Anticipation	  Question	  	  
How	  much	  are	  you	  looking	  forward	  to	  the	  upcoming	  conversation?	  Please	  
provide	  your	  rating	  by	  circling	  a	  number	  on	  the	  scale	  below:	  	  	  Not	  at	  all	   	   	  	   	   	  Somewhat	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Very	  much	  	  1-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐2-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐3-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐4-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐5-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐6-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐7	  	  	  	  	   Willingness	  Question	  	  
How	  much	  are	  you	  willing	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  upcoming	  conversation?	  Please	  
provide	  your	  rating	  by	  circling	  a	  number	  on	  the	  scale	  below:	  	  	  Not	  at	  all	   	   	  	   	   	  Somewhat	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Very	  much	  	  1-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐2-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐3-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐4-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐5-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐6-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐7	  
	  
	  
	  
